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I
INTRODUCTION

Judges in computer software copyright cases have paid scant attention to a
provision of the copyright statute intended to limit the scope of copyright
protection' in accordance with the principles of the most venerated of
American copyright cases, Baker v. Selden. 2 That provision is section 102(b) of
the Copyright Act of 1976. It states: "In no event does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery." 3 That section

102(b) has been so little analyzed in software copyright cases is especially
surprising because it was added to the copyright statute in part to ensure that
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1. See, for example, Whelan Associates, Inc. vJaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F2d 1222 (3d Cir 1986)
(section 102(b) mentioned, but not incorporated into the court's infringement test or infringement
analysis); Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v CAMS, Inc., 706 F Supp 984 (D Conn 1989) (section 102(b)
only invoked to render certain user interface navigational conventions unprotectable by copyright
law); Broderbund Software, Inc. v Unison World, Inc., 648 F Supp 1127 (ND Cal 1986) (one "see also"
reference to section 102(b), but no discussion of the provision in the court's analysis of the copyright
issues).
2. 101 US 99 (1879). The extent to which Congress intended to codify Baker v Selden by
enacting 17 USC § 102(b) (1988) is the subject of some academic debate. See J. H. Reichman,
Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protectionfor Commercialized
University Research, 42 Vand L Rev 639, 693-95 n288 (1989). Courts interpreting section 102(b) have
construed it as codifying substantial portions of Baker v Selden. See, for example, NEC v Intel Corp., 10
USPQ2d (BNA) 1177 (ND Cal 1989), and Signo Trading Intl v Gordon, 535 F Supp 362, 365 (ND Cal
1981). The words of the provision, particularly those that refer to the unprotectability of processes,
procedures, systems, and methods of operation, are derived from Baker v Selden and the many cases
following it. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
3. 17 USC § 102(b).
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copyright protection for computer programs would not be construed too
4
broadly.
In the eleven years since the copyright statute was amended to state
explicitly that computer programs could be protected by copyright law, 5 there
have been numerous controversies over the proper application of copyright
law to computer programs. 6 Especially controversial have been several cases
involving user interfaces of computer programs. 7 A case that was widely
4. The House and Senate Reports state quite clearly: "Some concern has been expressed lest
copyright in computer programs should extend protection to the methodology or processes adopted
by the programmer, rather than merely to the 'writing' expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is
intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the
copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied
in the program are not within the scope of copyright law." HR Rep No 1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 57
(1976), reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 5659, 5670; S Rep No 473, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 54 (1976).
Professor Arthur Miller testified at hearings leading up to passage of the 1976 Act that without a
provision of this sort in the statute, copyrights in computer programs might become the equivalent
of patents for important elements of programs. This, he asserted, would stultify development of
software. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong, 1st Sess 197 (1967). See also Letter from Professor
Arthur Miller to Salem Katsch, Esq., 6 (Oct 29, 1985) (expressing the view that section 102(b)
codified Baker v Selden; also indicating that it was for patent law, not copyright, to protect the
processes, systems, and methods of operations embodied in programs).
5. In 1974 Congress enacted legislation to establish the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU). Pub L No 93-573, title II, 88 Stat 1873, 187374. Among the issues this commission addressed was whether computer programs should be
protected by copyright law. See National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works, Final Report ch III (1979) ("CONTU Report"). Although a majority of the CONTU
members regarded the 1976 Act as already having provided copyright protection to computer
programs, the CONTU majority nevertheless recommended that Congress amend the copyright
statute to make explicit that programs could be copyrighted, and to define the term "computer
program" and add a provision permitting back-up copying and modifications to software. CONTU's
proposed amendments to the copyright statute were added to An Act to Amend the Patent and
Trademark Laws, HR 6943, 96th Cong, 2d Sess (1980), which became Pub L No 96-517, 94 Star
3007 (1980), codified at 17 USC §§ 101, 117 (1980).
Notwithstanding the 1980 amendments, there were still a number of challenges to the
copyrightability of certain kinds of computer programs after the passage of this act, most notably
those involving operating system programs and microcode. See generally Peter S. Menell, Tailoring
Legal Protectionfor Computer Software, 39 Stan L Rev 1329 (1987); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited:
The Case against Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs in Machine-ReadableForm, 1984 Duke L J 663.
6. An overview of the many controversies over the application of copyright to computer
programs can be found in Pamela Samuelson, Reflections on the State of American Software Copyright Law
and the Perils of Teaching It, 13 Colum-VLA J L & Arts 61 (1988). For a more in-depth treatment of
copyright issues raised by the protection of structural abstractions of computer programs and user
interfaces, see Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protectionfor Application Programs, 41
Stan L Rev 1045 (1989); LaST FrontierConference Report on Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 30
Jurimetrics J 15 (1989) ("LaST FrontierReport").
7. Because the first several software user interface copyright cases did not involve major
software firms (see, for example, cases cited in note 1), the cases were not much noticed in the
software industry, even though some of them laid the conceptual groundwork for the later, more
publicized user interface lawsuits by Lotus, Ashton-Tate, Apple, and Xerox. Until these lawsuits, the
general view in the technical community seemed to be that as long as someone wrote his or her own
code, it was legal to develop a competing application program with the same or very similar user
interface. The apparent legality of computer hardware clones may have caused those in the industry
to think, particularly in view of the interchangeability of hardware and software, that software clones
would be lawful as well. Software clones are thought by some in the technical community to offer
many of the same benefits to consumers that hardware clones had done: more product choices, price
competition, and improved or additional features. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Why the Look and
Feel of Software User Interfaces Should Not Be Protected by Copyright Law, 32 Communications of ACM 563
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expected to yield a landmark ruling on one set of controversial user interface
issues was Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International. In June of
1990, Judge Keeton issued a lengthy opinion in which he ruled that Lotus's
copyright in its popular 1-2-3 spreadsheet program protected the user
interface of that program, and that Paperback had infringed the Lotus
copyright by copying a number of aspects of that interface.8
This article will argue that the court in Paperback missed an important
opportunity to provide an updated interpretation of Baker v. Selden, the
copyright principles it represents, the embodiment of these principles in
section 102(b), and how these principles should be applied in copyright
disputes involving user interfaces of computer programs. Amidst the myriad
issues and defenses in the case (some of which may not have been strategically
advisable to assert 9 ), the court was unable to see the pertinence of some
important copyright principles that, if heeded, might have caused the judge to
view the issues in the case somewhat differently.' 0
This article will also argue that the court was so distracted by Paperback's
argument that "nonliteral elements" of computer programs were
"uncopyrightable" that it failed to engage in an inquiry as to whether the
aspects of the Lotus interface that Paperback copied were elements of the
Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet or macrocommand "system." Had such an inquiry
been made, and these elements been determined to be part of a system, they
would, under the principles of Baker v. Selden, its progeny, and section 102(b),
have been just as unprotected by copyright law as were the ledger sheets that
the Supreme Court ruled were unprotectable components of Selden's
bookkeeping system.
This article will go on to argue that the Paperback opinion fails to offer
persuasive reasons for its ruling that the Lotus interface was "expressive." It
will also criticize the court's analysis of the functionality of the Lotus user
interface and the copyright implications of this functionality. Copyright
protection for functional writings, such as spreadsheet programs, is
(1989). See also Pamela Samuelson & Robert Glushko, Comparingthe Views of Lawyers and User Interface
Designers on the Software Copyright "Look and Feel" Lawsuits, 30 Jurimetrics J 121 (1989) (reporting on a
survey of user interface designers).
The other major user interface case besides Lo.us v Paperback is the lawsuit by Apple Computer
against Microsoft Corporation and Hewlett-Packard Co., claiming exclusive rights in certain features
of the graphical user interface that have come to be associated with Apple. Because of the more
graphical character of the Apple interface, this lawsuit involves a somewhat different range of
copyright issues than the Lotus v Paperback dispute. See Samuelson, 32 Communications of ACM at
563 (cited in this note). This Apple lawsuit is currently awaiting trial.
8. 740 F Supp 37 (D Mass 1990).
9. See notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
10. The Lotus v Paperback lawsuit was settled out of court some months after issuance of the
opinion that this article will discuss at some length. Under the terms of the settlement agreement,
Paperback agreed not to appeal the district court's ruling, to take VP-Planner off the market, and to
pay $500,000 to Lotus. Although Paperback still regards the court's ruling as erroneous, it decided
that settling the dispute was in its best business interest. See Staff Report, Lotus to Receive $500,000 in
Copyright Case, Wall St J B4 col 2 (Oct 18, 1990); Lotus Settles Copyright Case, NY Times D4 col 3 (Oct
18, 1990).
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traditionally quite "thin." ' "I Generally, only exact or near-exact copying will
be found to infringe. Had the court used this approach to judge infringement
in Paperback, and persuasively explained what it found to be expressive about
Lotus's interface, Paperback might have been the landmark opinion for which
many were hoping, one on which the law of copyrighting computer programs
could have been firmly built.
As things stand now, Paperback seems to have stirred up more controversy
than it settled. It has met with distinctly mixed reactions in the technical
community, in part because people are uncertain about how broad or narrow
the court's ruling really was. 12 Several articles critical of the court's analysis
have already appeared in the law review literature.' 3 And a recent ruling of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that found no expressiveness in the
arrangement of commands for a spreadsheet program is in direct conflict with
the ruling in Paperback.'4 There is an opportunity, in a new Lotus lawsuit
against one of its spreadsheet competitors,1 5 forJudge Keeton, or perhaps the

11. See, for example, Continental Casualty Co. v Beardsley, 253 F2d 702 (2d Cir 1958); LaST Frontier
Report, 30JurimetricsJ at 18-19 (cited in note 6).
12. See sources cited in Pamela Samuelson, How to Interpret the Lotus Decision (And How Not to), 33
Communications of ACM 27 (1990).
13. See, for example, Ronald Abramson, Why Lotus-Paperback Uses the Wrong Test and What the
New Software Protection Legislation Should Look Like, 7 Computer L 6 (Aug 1990); D. Lee Antton & Gary
M. Hoffman, Copyright Protection and Innovation: The Impact of Lotus Development v Paperback
Software, 7 Computer L 1 (Aug 1990); Richard H. Stern, Legal Protection of Screen Displays and Other
User Interfacesfor Computers: A Problem in Balancing Incentives for Creation against Need for Free Access to the
Utilitarian, 14 Colum-VLAJ L & Arts 283 (1990); Comment, Lotus Development Corp. v Paperback
Software International: Broad Copyright Protection For User Interfaces Ignores the Software Industry 's Trend
Toward Standardization, 52 U Pitt L Rev 689 (1991) (authored by Gerard Lewis, Jr.); Comment,
Copyright Protectionfor Computer Languages: Creative Incentive or Technological Threat?, 39 Emory LJ 1293,
1330 (1990) (authored by Elizabeth G. Lowry).
14. Ashton-Tate Corp. v Ross, 916 F2d 516 (9th Cir 1990) (command structure for user interface of
spreadsheet program held to be "idea" under section 102(b)). The Ninth Circuit decision in Ross
was decided after the Lotus v Paperback ruling, but does not cite to that opinion. The Paperback
opinion did not cite to the trial court opinion in Ross, even though it was decided before the court's
ruling in Paperback. See Ashton-Tate Corp. v Ross, 728 F Supp 597, 602 (ND Cal 1989), aff'd, 916 F2d
516, 521-22 (9th Cir 1990). Ashton-Tate v Ross is discussed in notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
In a previous article, the author observed that software copyright cases have tended to be either
lengthy and elaborately flawed, or so cryptic as to provide little guidance on the reasoning that led to
the courts' conclusions. See Samuelson, 13 Colum-VLAJ L & Arts at 71-72 (cited in note 6), citing
Whelan, 797 F2d 1222, as an example of the lengthy but flawed variety, and Plains Cotton Cooperative
Ass'n of Lubbock Texas v Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc., 807 F2d 1256 (5th Cir 1987) (a case factually
and legally quite similar to Whelan, but which rejects its legal conclusion and reasoning) as an
example of the too cryptic variety. Paperback now joins Whelan in the lengthy and elaborately flawed
category, and Ross joins Plains Cotton in the too cryptic category. Of the two kinds of cases, the
lengthy and elaborately flawed variety is the more worrisome because judges in subsequent cases
may tend to equate length and elaborateness with sound analysis, which is sometimes not the case.
Judges in subsequent cases may find it easier to follow a prior ruling based on a lengthy analysis of
the issues than to dissect the lengthy analysis, locate its flaws, and construct the sounder analysis that
should have been done.
15. Lotus Dev. Corp. v Borland Intl, Inc., Civ A No 90-11662-K (D Mass). Judge Keeton will be
presiding in this case. A similar Lotus lawsuit against the Santa Cruz Organization has been settled
out of court. See Lotus Settles with Santa Cruz, NY Times C4 col 2 (June 18, 1991).
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First Circuit Court of Appeals, to bring about the clarification in the law that is
6
so sorely needed by the software development community.'
II
THE LOTUS V. PAPERBACK DISPUTE

The facts presented by the Paperback case are simple and straightforward.
Lotus Development Corporation owns a copyright in the very popular
spreadsheet program, Lotus 1-2-3. In the process of preparing its own
spreadsheet program (VP-Planner) to compete with the Lotus program,
Paperback Software decided to copy several aspects of the Lotus 1-2-3 user
interface, including its command structure. This was done to give consumers
already familiar with the Lotus commands and macrocommand facility a
lower-priced alternative product to purchase, one that could not only achieve
the same functionality as Lotus 1-2-3, but also offered some other desirable
7
functionalities that the Lotus product did not then have.'
Lotus then sued Paperback for copyright infringement. The complaint
detailed a number of specific aspects of the Lotus interface that Paperback
allegedly had wrongfully copied. These included the instruction, command,
and menu language of the Lotus 1-2-3 interface, the "structure, sequence,
and organization" ("SSO") of its screen displays and sequences of screen
displays, the macrocommands and syntax of Lotus 1-2-3, and the overall
"look and feel" of the interface.' 8
16. See, for example, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Intellectual Property
Issues in Software 4-6, 51-57 (Natl Research Council, 1991) ("NRC Report").
17. There were a number of differences between the Lotus and Paperback user interfaces. The
Paperback program had opening screen displays identifying the program as VP-Planner which were
unlike Lotus's. In general, Paperback's screens were wider than Lotus's and allowed users to hide
certain columns of data. Its help screens were organized differently than Lotus's. The menu bar of
VP-Planner appeared at the bottom of the screen instead of the top, as Lotus had for 1-2-3 (although
a user of VP-Planner could move the menu bar to the top of the screen, if the user preferred).
Paperback's menu of commands also generally listed "help" as the first command in the set. For
some submenus, VP-Planner had some additional commands that related to the data base capability
VP-Planner provided that 1-2-3 did not. VP-Planner also used somewhat different wording for
explanatory long prompts. See Paperback, 740 F Supp at 70.
The court nevertheless found Paperback's interface to be "strikingly [1 similar" to the Lotus
interface. Id. The court observed that because VP-Planner allowed users to move the menu bar
from the bottom of the screen to the top and some of the VP-Planner screens displayed an array of
commands identical to Lotus's, "a user could easily think 1-2-3 rather than VP-Planner was the
program in use." Id.
It is worth noting that this statement reflects a trademark-like analysis of the case: Infringement
should be found because the two works were confusingly similar, as if the problem was that
Paperback had copied the trade dress of 1-2-3. Trade dress theory for protecting the "look and feel"
of computer programs has been suggested by some commentators. See, for example, Richard A.
Beutel, Trade Dress Protection For the "Look and Feel" of Software: A New Source of Proprietary Rights
Protectionfor the Software Industry?, 5 Computer L 1 (Oct 1988).
One of the grounds on which Borland seeks to distinguish its dispute with Lotus from the
Paperback dispute is that no one could mistake its Lotus-compatible alternative interface for the
Lotus program because of distinctive characteristics of the Borland screens and their presentations of
the commands. Borland's Redacted Memorandum of Law Regarding the Phasing of the Case, Civ A
No 90-11662-K, at 11 (June 7, 1991) ("Borland Brief").
18. See Complaint of Lotus Development Corp., Lotus Dev. Corp. v Paperback Software, Inc., Civ A
No 87-76-K (Jan 1987). The "look and feel" claim was among the more controversial of the Lotus
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Paperback asserted a number of defenses to these claims. Its chief defense
was that it had copied only "uncopyrightable" elements of the Lotus
program.' 9 Under the umbrella of this main defense, Paperback made several
arguments. One was that only "literal" elements of computer programs (that
is, source or object code) are protectable by program copyrights. Because
user interfaces were "nonliteral" elements of programs, the copying of a user
interface could not infringe a program copyright. 20 A second defense was
that user interface screen displays are only protectable by copyright law if
separately registered with the Copyright Office. Because Lotus had registered
only the Lotus 1-2-3 program with the Copyright Office, Paperback argued
that the court lacked jurisdiction over the copyright dispute pending before
it.21 A third defense was that the Lotus interface was a functional humanmachine interface that was uncopyrightable under the "useful article"
doctrine of copyright law. 22 A fourth defense was that Lotus was essentially
claiming copyright protection for a computer language. Languages,
Paperback asserted, were not copyrightable. Paperback insisted it had not
infringed the copyright because it had copied only the language facility of
Lotus 1-2-3.23 Paperback's fifth argument was that it had been necessary for
Paperback to copy various aspects of the Lotus interface in order to offer a
"compatible" product to consumers. This seems to have been an argument
claims. The term is sometimes used in the technical community to describe the valuable functional
behavior of a program that occurs when the user interacts with the program via the user interface.
See, for example, NRC Report at 53 (cited in note 16). One reason for concern about the "look and
feel" claim in the Lotus lawsuit among those who design user interfaces was uncertainty about its
precise meaning. See Samuelson & Glushko, 30JurimetricsJ at 127 (cited in note 7). As a matter of
copyright law, there were a number of reasons to question whether the "look and feel" of programs
could be protected by copyright law. See, for example, Samuelson, 32 Communications of ACM at
563 (cited in note 7). At trial, Lotus seems not to have emphasized the "look and feel" claim;
Paperback states that the court did not find "look and feel" very helpful in resolving the copyright
issues in the case. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 62.
19. Two other Paperback defenses were laches and estoppel. Paperback asserted that Lotus had
known, six months before VP-Planner appeared on the market, that it would look and work like 1-23, and yet had waited 14 1/2 months after the Paperback product was released to raise any objections.
Lotus also only made its objections known by initiating the lawsuit against Paperback. The court was
persuaded that the delay in bringing suit was reasonable, citing cases that had found excusable delays
to give the plaintiff time to evaluate the matter and prepare to bring suit. Id at 82. It may be,
however, that Lotus was waiting to see what the Supreme Court would do with the appeal of the
Whelan decision, for the Lotus lawsuits against Paperback and Mosaic were filed the day the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in that case. For more discussion of the impact of the Whelan ruling on
Paperback, see notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
20. See notes 27-58 and accompanying text.
21. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 79. Although the court "emphatically" rejected this defense as
"frivolous" and based on a "word game" by the defense lawyers, it is worth observing that there was
at least one precedent, Digital CommunicationsAssoc., Inc. v Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F Supp 449 (ND
Ga 1987), that had ruled, after a thoughtful analysis on the relationship between computer programs
and user interface screen displays, that such screen displays were separate works from the programs
requiring separate copyright registrations. At the time Lotus filed the lawsuit against Paperback, the
Copyright Office policy had not been clear on the subject of whether user interfaces needed to be
separately registered or were covered by the underlying program copyright. See note 133 for further
discussion of this issue.
22. See notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
23. See notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
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that "idea" and "expression" had merged in the Lotus interface. 2 4 A sixth
defense was that user interests in standardization of spreadsheet interfaces
overrode the private interests of Lotus in the 1-2-3 interface. 2 5 Paperback
also argued that on public policy grounds, copyright law should not be
construed to extend protection to the elements of user interfaces for which
Lotus was seeking protection because it would impede progress in the
26
software industry.
Judge Keeton wrote an extensive opinion rejecting each of Paperback's
defenses. A close examination of this opinion suggests that certain defense
strategies may have backfired and prevented the judge from engaging in some
inquiries that would have proved more fruitful to the defense's objectives. By
making more extreme arguments than necessary to advance their cause, the
defense lawyers failed to focus the court's attention on the proper kind of
copyright inquiry for such a case. As a consequence, a number of
fundamental principles of copyright law that were quite relevant to the case
went unanalyzed. Part III will demonstrate how one of Paperback's principal
defenses got the copyright inquiry off on the wrong track.
III
GETTING DISTRACTED BY THE "UNCOPYRIGHTABILITY"

OF

"NONLITERAL" ELEMENTS DEFENSE

One of Paperback's principal defenses was that only "literal" elements of
computer programs (that is, source and object code) were protectable by a

copyright in a computer program. Paperback asserted that a user interface
was a "nonliteral" element of a computer program, and as such, it was an
"uncopyrightable" element of the program.2 7 Whether it is appropriate to

conceive of a user interface as a "literal" or "nonliteral" element of a
computer program is a more complex intellectual problem than Paperback
might suggest. 28 For purposes of this discussion, however, it will suffice to

accept the characterization of the Lotus interface as a "nonliteral" element of
24. See notes 101-112 and accompanying text.
25. See note 94.
26. Both Paperback and Lotus presented opinion evidence to the court concerning the effect
that its ruling would have on the software industry. The court also took note of an article reporting
the results of a survey of user interface designers that reflected strong opposition to the copyright
"look and feel" lawsuits. See Samuelson & Glushko, 30 Jurimetrics J at 127-28 (cited in note 7).
Although the court permitted the proferred evidence to be put into the record, it ultimately
concluded that this kind of evidence was irrelevant to the copyright issues in the case. See Paperback,
740 F Supp at 73-77.
27. The origins of the "uncopyrightable subject matter" characterization of the kind of defense
raised in Paperback can be traced to Baker v Selden, 101 US 99 (1879). As note 29 explains, the more
modern characterization of this kind of defense would be that the aspect of the work that the plaintiff
was seeking to protect was outside the scope of the copyright. Nevertheless, cases continue to
discuss whether certain aspects of copyrighted works are "copyrightable." See, for example,
Freedman v Grolier Enteprises, Inc., 179 USPQ (BNA) 476 (SDNY 1974) (discussing the
"copyrightability" of a certain notation system for playing cards).
28. See note 157 and accompanying text. It is worth noting here that notwithstanding the
court's adoption of the "nonliteral" terminology, the opinion relies on "verbatim copying" to
support the conclusion of infringement. See Paperback, 740 F Supp at 70.
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the program and to concentrate, for the moment, on the effect the
"uncopyrightability of nonliteral elements" defense had on the nature of the
copyright discourse in the case.
One very important effect of this defense was to narrow dramatically the
analytic focus of the case. The copyright discourse shifted from one about the
proper scope of the Lotus copyright in the context of an infringement analysis
to one about the "copyrightability" of "nonliteral" elements of computer
programs. 2 9 The "nonliteral elements" defense was very risky because if the
court could be persuaded that any nonliteral element of any computer
program could properly be protected, the defense would founder. Several
previous cases had ruled that some nonliteral elements of computer programs
could be protected by copyright law, including the widely cited Third Circuit
30
Court of Appeals decision, Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.
29. The "nonliteral" elements defense affected the way in which the judge phased the trial for
the case, as well as the "test" the court used in ruling on Lotus's claims. The first phase of the trial,
as delineated in Paperback, was to determine "whether and to what extent plaintiff's computer
spreadsheet program, Lotus 1-2-3, was copyrightable." 740 F Supp at 42. Phase two was to be a jury
trial on issues of facts relating to whether the defendants had copied protected expression from 1-23, including whether defendants had copied expression from Lotus's source or object code. Id. The
court resolved the entire case in the first phase proceeding. After ruling that the Lotus interface was
a copyrightable component of the Lotus program, id at 68, the court decided that there was no
genuine issue of fact requiring a phase two trial. The court observed that Paperback had conceded it
had copied many elements of the Lotus interface, and these elements were, in the court's view,
incontrovertibly substantial components of the program. Id at 68-70.
As part of its phase one proceeding, the court set forth three "elements" of what it called the
"legal test for deciding copyrightability" in Paperback. Id at 59. The first "element," said to be
derived from Judge Learned Hand's "patterns of abstraction" test in Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp.,
45 F2d 119, 121 (2d Cir 1930), was that "the decisionmaker must focus upon alternatives that
counsel may suggest, or the court may conceive, along the scale from the most generalized conception to the

most particularized,and choose some formulation-some conception or definition of the 'idea'-for the
purpose of distinguishing between the idea and its expression." Id at 60 (emphasis in the original).
The second element of the test was that "the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an alleged
expression of the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of that idea (or is one of only a
few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable elements of expression not essential
to every expression of that idea." Id at 61 (emphasis in the original). The third was "having
identified elements of expression not essential to every expression of the idea, the decisionmaker
must focus on whether those elements are a substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable 'work.'
The court indicated that this was to be judged on a qualitative, not just a quantitative, basis. Id.
This test is a highly idiosyncratic and erroneous analytic procedure for assessing the copyright
issues raised by Paperback. A more appropriate way to frame the copyright issues in Paperback would
have been to inquire, as part of a copyright infringement analysis, whether the aspects of the Lotus
interface for which Lotus was seeking protection were properly considered within the scope of
copyright protection available for the Lotus program. That is, were these aspects part of the
protectable elements of "expression" of the program? See Paul Goldstein, Copyright Principles, Law
and Practice ch 7 (Little Brown, 1989).
In the author's view, no "copyrightability" issue is present in a computer copyright case as long as
the source and object code of the program meet the requirements of section 102(a) as an "original
work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." See 17 USC § 102(a). Paperback
was not arguing that there was no original expression in the Lotus program, that the program was
not fixed enough to be copyrighted, or that the program was otherwise disqualified from being
considered a protectable "work of authorship" under the statute. Only these arguments are now
considered to be "copyrightability" issues. One of a number of reasons that Baker v Selden is in need
of an updated interpretation is that its framing of the issue in these kinds of cases as a "copyrightable
subject matter" issue is not in keeping with how copyright law is interpreted nowadays.
30. 797 F2d 1222 (3d Cir 1986). Whelan has been cited with approval in several cases for the
proposition that nonliteral elements of programs can be protected by copyright law. See, for
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Therefore, a defense based on the unprotectability of nonliteral elements of
programs was, as a strategic matter, almost suicidal.
Paperback made much the same argument in the Lotus case as Jaslow had
in Whelan. Support for the proposition that copyright protection is available
only for source and object code of computer programs is said to come from
three sources: the statutory definition of computer programs, 3 1 the absence
of legislative history indicating an intent to bring nonliteral elements of
programs within the scope of copyright protection,3 2 and judicial decisions
denying copyright protection to certain nonliteral elements of programs.3 3 In
addition, the defendants in Whelan and Paperback argued that there was a need
for a "bright line" standard so that software developers would know what they
could lawfully copy from other programs. 34 A narrow scope of copyright
protection for programs was also claimed to be desirable so as not to interfere
with the kind of incremental development that characterizes software
35
innovation.
example, Manufacturers Technologies, 706 F Supp at 992; PearlSystems, Inc. v Competition Electronics, Inc., 8
USPQ2d (BNA) 1520, 1524 (SD Fla 1988); Broderbund, 648 F Supp at 1133.
31. "Computer program" is defined in the copyright statute as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."
17 USC § 101 (1988). The user interface of a program can accurately be described as among the
"results" that can be generated when a program is executed in a computer. The user interface itself
is not among the set of statements or instructions constituting a program that can be processed in the
computer to bring about results. See, for example, Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and
the New Protectionism, 28JurimetricsJ 33 (1987); Stern, 14 Colum-VLAJ L & Arts at 350 (cited in note
13).
32. There is no consensus among former CONTU Commissioners and staff members about
whether CONTU thought that nonliteral elements of programs, such as their "structure, sequence,
and organization," would be protectable by copyright. The Executive Director of the Commission
staff and the chairman of the CONTU subcommittee on the copyrightability of computer programs
think not. See Kenneth A. Liebman, Salem M. Katsch & David D. Leitch, Back to Basics: A Critique of
the EmergingJudicialAnalysis of the Outer Limits of Computer Program "Expression, " 2 Computer L 1 (Dec
1985) (discussing Commissioner Miller's and Director Levine's views); ArthurJ. Levine, Comment on
Bonito Boats Follow- Up: The Supreme Court's Likely Reection of Nonliteral Software Copyright Protection, 6
Computer L 29 (July 1989). Two other CONTU Commissioners disagree. See E. Gabriel Perle,
Christopher Meyer & Victor Siber, Bonito Boats Redux, 7 Computer L 1 (Feb 1990) (with an
appendix on the now-deceased CONTU Commissioner Nimmer's views on CONTU's intent with
regard to protection of nonliteral elements of programs). Both sides have found something in the
CONTU Report to support their views on this matter. Id. (It is, however, worth noting that all of the
examples of wrongful copying that CONTU discusses are "literal" copying examples. See CONTU
at 22 (cited in note 5)).
Because of this nonconsensus, the CONTU Report is not an especially helpful source of
information about the Commission's understanding of what it was recommending. There is little
else in the legislative history of the 1980 software amendments to indicate congressional intent on
this issue. See Samuelson, 1984 Duke LJ at 666 (cited in note 5). Paperback indicates that CONTU
had not explicitly addressed the central issue presented in the Lotus case. 740 F Supp at 50. It
nonetheless quotes from Nimmer's views and merely notes the differing views of Miller and Levine.
Id at 51.
33. See, for example, Synercom Technology, Inc. v University Computing Co., 462 F Supp 1003 (ND
Tex 1978); Plains Cotton, 807 F2d 1256.
34. See Whelan, 797 F2d at 1237-38; Paperback, 740 F Supp at 73.
35. Whelan at 1237-38; see Paperbackat 77-79. Paperback treats this as a "policy" argument rather
than as a principle of copyright law applicable to functional works. See notes 123-127 and
accompanying text for further discussion of this issue.
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The Third Circuit already had rejected this defense in Whelan. Because
nonliteral elements of other "literary works" (a statutory classification into
which computer programs are said to fall) had long been protected by
copyright law,3 6 the court thought it appropriate for such elements to be
protected in programs as well. It rejected the "bright line" standard
argument as inconsistent with the congressional intent to have courts use the
traditional idea/expression distinction,3 7 and the incremental innovation
argument as one that, if accepted, would provide too little incentive to invest
in software development.3 8 Consequently, it concluded that nonliteral
elements of a program, such as its "structure, sequence, and organization,"
39
could be protected by copyright law.
Although rejecting the "bright line" standard proposed by the defense,
the Third Circuit in Whelan seems to have offered a highly protectionistic one
in its stead: "[t]he purpose or function [of a program is] the work's idea, and
everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function [is] part of the
expression." 40 Necessity, the court declared, was to be tested by determining
whether there are more than a small number of ways to achieve the function. 4 '
Although this test has been extensively criticized by commentators, 42 it has
been used with some frequency in the software copyright case law, 43 for it has
the apparent virtue of all "bright line" tests of providing judges faced with
complicated legal arguments about factually complex phenomena with a
44
simple basis for making distinctions that will resolve the case before them.
That the court in Paperback took the Third Circuit's shortcut through what
36. Whelan, 797 F2d at 1234; Paperback, 740 F Supp at 51. Although Paperback acknowledges that
the statutory definition of a "literary work" is far broader than "works of literature" (which the term
would ordinarily connote), it nonetheless cites a string of cases involving works of literature and
other artistic and fanciful works in support of the proposition that nonliteral elements of copyrighted
works can be protected by copyright law. Id. As Part V will show, functional writings generally have
a much narrower scope of copyright protection than literature, drama, and other artistic and fanciful
works.
37. The aspect of the CONTU Report that both Whelan and Paperback considered to be a reliable
reflection of congressional intent is that which expresses confidence that the courts could draw the
proper line between "idea" and "expression" in computer program cases. See CONTU Report at
18-23 (cited in note 5). Had CONTU and Congress intended for the line between copyrightable and
uncopyrightable elements of programs to be drawn between their literal and nonliteral elements, the
courts reasoned that they would have said so. Whelan, 797 F2d at 1241; Paperback, 740 F Supp at 54,
73.
38. Whelan, 797 F2d at 1237-38. For similar reasoning, see Paperback, 740 F Supp at 75-76.
39. Whelan, 797 F2d at 1240.
40. Id at 1236.
41. Id.
42. See, for example, Karjala, 28JurimetricsJ 33 (cited in note 31); Menell, 41 Stan L Rev 1045
(cited in note 6); LaST Frontier Report, 30 Jurimetrics J at 90 (cited in note 6).
43. See, for example, Broderbund, 648 F Supp at 1133; Pearl Systems, 8 USPQ2d (BNA) 1520 (both
applying the Whelan test).
44. Paperback indicates that despite their superficial appeal, "bright line" rules often result in
injustice. To reach just results, the opinion states, it is necessary to carefully weigh the facts and
circumstances of each case. 740 F Supp at 73. Yet, by adopting the Whelan approach, the court in
Paperback seems to have unconsciously slipped into the error of a "bright line" standard, one that is
inconsistent with copyright statute and case law, as will be demonstrated further in Parts IV and V.

Page 311: Spring 19921

A CRITIQUE OF PAPERBACK

would otherwise have been a dense thicket of copyright issues is evident from
a close reading of the opinion.
In Paperback, 45 the court identified "the idea" of the Lotus program in
terms of its general purpose or function, that is, as a "computer spreadsheet
program." 4 6 This was, of course, unprotectable by copyright law. 4 7 More

particular details of the program, such as the rotated "L" creating the
spreadsheet grid, the "/" key for invoking the menu of commands, and the
command structure, were treated, in accordance with the Whelai test, as
presumptively expressive. Therefore, unless the court found them to be
"necessary" elements of a spreadsheet program, they would be established as
copyrightable expressive elements. 4 8 Although recognizing that there were
some spreadsheet programs that did not use the rotated "L" as a spreadsheet
grid or the "/" to invoke the menu of commands, the court in Paperback
concluded that there was only a limited number of options for accomplishing
the functions these details served. 49 The court thus concluded that these
were necessary elements of spreadsheet programs, and consequently, were
instances in which idea and expression had "merged," and what would
50
otherwise have been "expression" had become "idea."
The court further concluded that other elements of the Lotus 1-2-3
interface, particularly its command structure and its mode of presentation of
the commands, were not necessary for accomplishing spreadsheet program
functions. In support of this conclusion, the court relied on the fact that it
was possible to design a spreadsheet program with a different command
structure and mode of presentation than that used by Lotus, which was
evident from examination of the interfaces of a number of other spreadsheet
programs that were different from Lotus'. 5 1 Having determined that these
45. See note 29 for the three elements to Paperback's legal test for copyrightability.
46. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 42.
47. Id at 65.
48. Id at 66-67. Under the court's test, finding particular details to be "expressive" would not
automatically mean that copyright infringement would be found, but such a finding that would mean
the court would have to proceed to the third step of determining if the details were substantial
elements of the work. See note 29.
49. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 66-67. Stern questions the factual basis of certain of the court's
assertions that there were a limited number of ways to achieve these functions. See, for example,
Stern, 14 Colum-VLAJ L & Arts at 335 (cited in note 13). A better copyright analysis of these details
of the Lotus interface, as with Paperback's use of "-+" to represent addition and "-" to represent
subtraction, would have been that these elements, because so commonly found in spreadsheet
programs, had become conventional elements of such programs, which should be treated in the same
manner scines d faire typically are in copyright law-as unprotectable by copyright. The court in
Paperback seems to have avoided this way of analyzing the copyright status of these elements because
of the deep disfavor with which it viewed Paperback's "standardization" defense. See note 94.
50. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 66-67.
51. The court listed seven spreadsheet programs that had different menu structures from Lotus
1-2-3, but also said that the idea of a menu structure for a spreadsheet program "could be expressed
in a great many if not literally unlimited number of ways." Id at 67-68. For similar statements, see
JWhelan, 797 F2d at 1239. What does not seem to have occurred to the court in either case is that the
different interfaces of other programs might reflect use of different "systems" or "methods of
operation," rather than differences in expression.
How unwilling the court in Paperback was to take seriously any "necessity" defense when a
commercially valuable element of the Lotus program was at stake is demonstrated by the dicta in its
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aspects of the Lotus interface were expression, the remaining question the
court addressed was whether they were substantial components of the Lotus
program, to which the court thought it "incontrovertible" that the answer
52
must be yes.

The principal criticism that has been leveled at the Whelan test is that it
53
takes an overly narrow view of what copyright law considers to be "idea."
On its face, the test begins with the presumption that there is only one idea to
be found in every computer program, and that all else in the work is
expression unless a necessity test takes it out of the expression category and
propels it into the idea category. 54 The Whelan test fails to take account of the
fact that the term "idea" in copyright parlance is not confined in its meaning
to "abstract generalized conceptions," such as the general purpose or
function of a program; rather, it is a metaphor used in copyright law to
55
describe the unprotectable elements in a copyrighted work.
More specifically, the Whelan test fails to consider the full text of section
102(b), which indicates that such things as processes, procedures, systems,
and methods of operation are unprotectable by copyright law even when
analysis of Paperback's "compatibility" defense. Paperback had asserted that unless it employed the
same menu structure as Lotus (to make its product "compatible" with Lotus), it could not hope to
achieve commercial success in the marketplace. While the court was persuaded that Excel's success
in the spreadsheet market showed that it was not necessary to copy the Lotus command structure in
order to be commercially successful, the court went on to say:
[Elven if VP-Planner otherwise would have been a commercial failure, and even if no other
technological ways of achieving macro and menu compatibility existed, the desire to achieve
"compatibility" or "standardization" cannot override the rights of authors to a limited
monopoly in the expression embodied in their intellectual "work."
Paperback, 740 F Supp at 69. This statement suggests that the court would find it difficult to accept
"idea/expression merger" for any valuable feature of the Lotus program, although the opinion
elsewhere recognizes merger as standard copyright doctrine. Id at 59. The statement also seems to
reflect a willingness to let Lotus enjoy a complete monopoly in the electronic spreadsheet market, a
result hardly in keeping with CONTU's assurances that copyright protection for programs would not
lead to monopolization of the market for program products or deter entry of competitors. See
CONTU Report at 23-24 (cited in note 5).
52. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 68. The court stated, in support of this proposition, that the Lotus
interface was "its most unique element, and is the aspect that has made 1-2-3 so popular." Id.
Further proof of its substantiality was said to be that the defendants had bothered to copy it. Id.
53. See, for example, LaST Frontier Report, 30 Jurimetrics J at 20 (cited in note 6).
54. One of many reasons why this is an inappropriate approach is that it will contribute to
confusion about what is protectable by copyright in a program and what is patentable. The general
purpose or function of a program is probably no more patentable than it is copyrightable. A
particular way of achieving a program function, however, may now be patentable. See note 113.
Only a cursory study of patents is required to discern that patent specifications routinely describe the
different ways that the general function(s) of the invention had been accomplished in the prior art as
a basis for establishing the novelty of the claimed inventive new way to do it. Thus, the existence of
other ways of doing something is as likely to indicate that there are other patentable methods for
achieving the same function as it is to indicate that there are other copyrightable nonliteral
expressions of how to do it. The Paperback decision, like the Whelan decision before it, contributes to
the confusion about what is protectable by copyright and patent law in a program, instead of helping
to resolve it.
55. Paperback seems at one point to recognize this, for it states that the idea/expression
distinction "embraces also the process-expression, method-expression, and useful-expressive
distinctions." 740 F Supp at 53. But the court fails to carry through with this'kind of analysis.
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embodied in the text of a copyrighted work. 5 6 The Whelan test also ignores
the legislative history of the 1976 Act indicating that section 102(b) was added
to the statute in part to ensure that copyright protection for computer
programs would not be construed too broadly, that is, to ensure that such
things as the "methods" and "processes" of "a program" would not be
protected by copyright law. 5 7 The text of section 102(b), as well as the case
law properly interpreting it, demonstrates unequivocally that not all
"nonliteral" elements of a program should be treated equally under copyright
law, as they are under the Whelan test, and not all should be presumed to be
expression. Because there may well be more than a few methods or systems
of achieving some general purpose, the mere existence of alternatives does
not demonstrate that a nonliteral aspect of a computer program is
"expressive.'"58
Another reason that the Whelan test is unsuitable as a test for copyright
infringement for computer programs is that programs are often assemblages
of components that could be packaged separately instead of being combined.
A spreadsheet program, for example, might include a calculation component,
a graphing component, and a data base component. If the Whelan test is
applied to a software package combining these functions into one program,
"the idea" in the program will be an electronic spreadsheet, and the three
components, because they are more specific details, would be treated as
presumptively expressive. If, however, the three components were packaged
as separate programs, graphing would now be "the idea" of the graphing
component, and only lower level details would be presumptively expressive
(even though some of them may well be methods or processes). This
demonstrates how much of a "word game" the Whelan test can be.
The proper inquiry in copyright cases involving computer programs must
be much broader than the highly protectionist Whelan "bright-line" test
permits. The remainder of this article will set forth the nature of the inquiry
the court might have made had it not been distracted by Paperback's
nonliteral elements defense. Part IV shows that a proper copyright inquiry in
the case would have addressed two questions: whether any of the aspects of
the Lotus interface that Paperback had copied-most importantly, the Lotus
command structure-were constituent elements of a system for managing
56. Section 102(b) is duly quoted in a background section of Paperback. Id at 49. Although
occasionally referred to in a cursory manner thereafter, neither this section nor its contents (except
that referring to the unprotectability of "ideas") is discussed in the subsection of the opinion on
functionality issues, id at 54-58, in the subsection describing the legal test for copyrightability used in
the case, id at 59-62, or in the sections that analyze the "copyrightability" of various elements of the
Lotus interface and Paperback's copying of them, id at 63-70.
57. In a background section of the opinion, id at 49, Paperback quoted the relevant passage from
the House Report (see note 4), but made no effort to give it content. The terms "methods" and
"processes" are emphasized in the text because the House Report's use of the plural expression
demonstrates quite clearly that Congress thought there would be more than one of them per
program.
58. Baker v Selden, discussed in notes 63-92 and accompanying text, is one example of this
principle. See also Bibbero Systems, Inc. v Colwell Systems, Inc., 893 F2d 1104 (9th Cir 1990), discussed
in note 142 and accompanying text.
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spreadsheet functions or for constructing macros, and whether some copying
of these elements was required to permit others to use or "express" the same
system. Part V discusses the kind of inquiry the court should have made about
what was "expressive" in the Lotus interface and whether any "expressive"
elements were appropriated by Paperback.
IV
WAS THE LOTUS COMMAND STRUCTURE PART OF THE LoTUs
SPREADSHEET SYSTEM?

Paperback discusses the "idea/expression" distinction at some length 5 9 but
contains no analysis of whether any aspects of the Lotus interface might have
been part of an unprotectable "system" for managing spreadsheet functions

or for constructing macrocommands even though there are statements in the
opinion strongly suggesting that this was the case. 60 Section 102(b) indicates

that "systems" are as unprotectable as abstract ideas, in harmony with a long
line of copyright cases that go virtually unmentioned in Paperback.6 1 The
"venerable" Baker v. Selden case is among the numerous precedents holding
that an arrangement of words that is a constituent part of a system is not
within the scope of copyright protection for the work, no matter how valuable

or innovative the arrangement might be. 62 In addition to reviewing Baker v.
59. See Paperback, 740 F Supp at 53-61, 65-68. For discussion of the court's "useful/expressive"
distinction, see id at 53-58.
60. The strongest of these statements can be found in id at 65, discussed in notes 101-103 and
accompanying text. See also, id at 67 (comparing the "menu command system" of Visicalc with that
of Lotus); id at 78 (referring to use of "" to invoke the "menu command system" and Lotus's
"macrocommand facility" and "command facility").
61. See, for example, Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v Gruber, 86 F2d 958 (1st Cir 1936) (promotional
system not protectable by copyright); Brief English Systems, Inc. v Owen, 48 F2d 555 (2d Cir 1931)
(shorthand system not protectable by copyright on booklets about it); Chautauqua School of Nursing v
National School of Nursing, 238 F 151 (2d Cir 1916) (twelve-step hypodermic injection procedure not
protectable by copyright in lecture); Long v Jordan, 29 F Supp 287 (ND Cal 1939) (old age pension
system not protectable by copyright on pamphlet); Burk vJohnson, 146 F 209 (8th Cir 1906) (system
for organizing mutual burial associations not protected by copyright in pamphlet);Amberg File & Index
Co. v Shea Smith & Co., 82 F 314 (7th Cir 1897) (indexing system not copyrightable); Griggs v Perrin, 49
F 15 (2d Cir 1892) (stenography system not protected by copyright in book); Arica Institute, Inc. v
Palmer, 1991 Copyright L Rptr (CCH) 26,712 (SDNY 1991) (spiritual system not protectable by
copyright in training manuals); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v Carabio, 203 USPQ (BNA) 124 (ED Mich 1979)
(system for teaching problem-solving techniques not protectable by copyright); Freedman v Grolier
Enterprises, 179 USPQ (BNA) 476 (notation system for playing cards not protectable by copyright);
Aldrich v Remington Rand, 52 F Supp 732 (ND Tex 1942) (tax recording system not protectable by
copyright); Muller v Triborough Bridge Authority, 43 F Supp 298 (SDNY 1942) (traffic separation system
not within scope of copyright on drawings); Seltser v Sunbrock, 22 F Supp 621 (SD Cal 1938) (roller
derby system not protectable by copyright in book); Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v Dugan Piano Co., 210 F
399 (ED La 1914) (system of salesmanship not protectable by copyright on instruction manual);
Simms v Stanton, 75 F 6 (ND Cal 1896) (physiognomy classification systems not protectable by
copyrights in books). See also Healthcare Affiliated Services, Inc. v Lippany, 701 F Supp 1142 (WD Pa
1988) (use of similar systems and methods in computer program not copyright infringement); Fishing
Concepts, Inc. v Ross, 226 USPQ (BNA) 692 (D Minn 1985) (processes in computer program not
protectable by copyright); Midway Mfg. v Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F Supp 125 (D NJ 1982) (game
rules not protectable by copyright).
62. A number of the "system" decisions (cited in note 61) involve arrangements of words as
elements of the system. Arica Institute, 1991 Copyright L Rptr (CCH) $ 26,712, is a recent example of
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Selden as a representative of the word-arrangement-as-system-elements cases,
this section of the article suggests that, properly construed, Paperback's
"language" defense was a section 102(b) "system" defense that the court
should have taken more seriously.
A.

Baker v. Selden: The Arrangement of Words as Part of a System

Baker v. Selden is an important precedent to consider in assessing the Lotus
v. Paperback dispute, not only because it is the "venerable" Supreme Court
decision that ruled that constituent elements of systems embodied in
copyrighted works are not protected by the copyright, 63 but also because it
seems to be the only prior copyright case to have involved a claim of copyright
infringement based on spreadsheet similarities. 6 4 It is therefore somewhat
surprising how little attention Paperback gives to Baker v. Selden. That case is
discussed in two sentences in the middle of a long paragraph in a part of the
opinion remote from the analysis of the merits of Lotus's claim and of
Paperback's defenses. 6 5 Although Paperback makes a passing reference
comparing the Lotus electronic spreadsheet to paper spreadsheets, 66 the
larger similarities between the two cases, in terms of their facts, the parties'
legal contentions, and the Court's ruling seem to have escaped the Paperback
court's attention.
Paperback begins its brief discussion of Baker v. Selden by referring to it as a
"seminal case" 6 7 that held "that the text of a book describing a special
method of double-entry accounting on paper spreadsheets . . . was
copyrightable expression, but that the ... idea of this particular kind of doubleentry bookkeeping, was not." 68 The Supreme Court's statement of its

holding in the case was importantly different from the district court's
description of it in Paperback. The Court actually said that Selden's copyright
protected his "explanation" of the accounting method, but not the useful
a case in which the arrangement of words was considered to be outside the scope of copyright
because of its role as an element of a system. Palmer had written a book discussing the Arica
philosophy, and reproduced diagrams closely resembling those in Arica's manuals. Arica sued for
copyright infringement. Palmer defended by asserting that what she had copied were elements of
Arica's system for curing ego fixation problems, which were illustrated by the diagrams consisting of
nine-pointed stars surrounded by a circle. Each point of the stars was inscribed with a word or
phrase that symbolized a component of the system. The ordering of the components was also part of
the system. The court stated: "The copyright laws do not confer a monopoly on Arica in the method
of describing a particular and interrelated set of characteristics or traits." Id at $ 24,159. See also
note 88 concerning the irrelevance of the value or degree of innovation of the system in judging its
status under copyright law.
63. CONTU described Baker v Selden as a "venerable case." CONTU was confident that it and
cases like it would provide guidance to the courts in attempting to distinguish what in a program
should be regarded as idea or expression. CONTU Report at 18 (cited in note 5).
64. See notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
65. See Paperback, 740 F Supp at 53-54. The "legal test for copyrightability" discussion is found
in the opinion, id at 59-62, and the discussion of the expressive elements of the Lotus interface is
found at 65-68.
66. Id at 63.
67. Id at 54.
68. Id (emphasis in the original).

326

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. 2

"art" (that is, the bookkeeping method or system) explained in the book. 6 9
This correct formulation of the rule of Baker v. Selden makes clear something
that is sometimes forgotten about the case: Baker v. Selden is fundamentally a
case about the unprotectability of the functional content of written works, and
the right of others to copy that content to make use of it.7 ° To speak of the
case as concerning only the unprotectability of abstract ideas oversimplifies
71
the Court's ruling.
A more serious mischaracterization of Baker v. Selden appears in the next
sentence of Paperback: "[t]he Court thus concluded that Baker did not
69. Baker v Selden, 101 US at 105.
70. Baker v Selden has truly been a "seminal case," for from it has grown a number of important
doctrines of American copyright law: (1) that the scope of protection for writings embodying
functional content is quite narrow, for the functional content is not protectable by copyright (see, for
example, Beardsley, 253 F2d at 702; Kepner-Tregoe, 203 USPQ (BNA) at 124); (2) that constructing a
useful article depicted in a copyrighted work does not infringe the copyright (see, for example,
Muller, 43 F Supp 298); (3) that blank forms are not copyrightable (see, for example, Bibbero, 893 F2d
1104); (4) that when there are significant constraints on the manner in which an idea can be
expressed, even using the same expression will not be infringing as an instance in which idea and
expression are said to be merged (see, for example, Morrssey v Proctor & Gamble, 379 F2d 675 (1st Cir
1967)); (5) that when useful elements of a copyrighted work must be copied in order to be used by
others, no copyright infringement should be found (see, for example, Kepner-Tregoe, 203 USPQ
(BNA) 124); and (6) that which is within the subject matter of utility patent law is outside the subject
matter of copyright, and that it would be a fraud on the public to give copyright protection to that
which has not satisfied the standards and procedures required by the patent system or to that which
is the subject of an expired patent (see, for example, Brief English Systems, 48 F2d at 555; Muller, 43 F
Supp 298; Korzybski v Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F2d 727 (2d Cir 1929)).
Some scholars regard this latter proposition to have been called into question by dicta in Mazer v
Stein, 347 US 201, 217 (1954) ("Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing
is patentable it may not be copyrighted."), and by In re Yardley, 493 F2d 1389 (CCPA 1974) (design
patent can issue on copyrighted work). See, for example, 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.19 (1991) ("Nimmer on Copyright"). Both of these decisions, however,
involved design patent and copyright issues, an area in which Congress may have contemplated some
degree of overlap. There is, however, no case holding that utility patents and copyrights can protect
the same aspect of the same work. Several cases, Baker v Selden among them, express the contrary
view. See also Taylor Instrument Co. v Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F2d 98, 99 (7th Cir 1943). Mazer itself cites
approvingly not only Baker v Selden, but two other cases in which the courts observed that plaintiffs
should have sought a patent if they wanted to protect the creative aspect of their work which they
were trying to protect through copyright. See note 71. The issue whether utility patents and
copyrights can protect the same aspect of computer programs is currently hotly debated among
intellectual property lawyers. See, for example, Perle, Meyer & Siber, 7 Computer L at 7-8 (cited in
note 32); D.C. Toedt, Bonito Boats Follow-up, 6 Computer L 28 (July 1989).
This author contends that, notwithstanding the dicta quoted above, Mazer v Stein did not effect
any significant change in the holding of Baker v Selden. The Court in Mazer merely decided that the
copyright in a statuette (which qualified for protection as a "work of art") was not invalidated
because of the subsequent reproduction of it to serve as a base for a lamp. The statuette served the
same aesthetic function as a lamp base as it had as a free-standing sculpture. The Court in Mazer
made clear that had the sculpture served a utilitarian function or had any utilitarian function been
intermingled with its aesthetic function, it would have regarded the matter differently. 347 US at
212-13. The 1976 Act has codified this aspect of Mazer. See 17 USC § 101 (definitions of "pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural work" and "useful article"). See also id at § 113. If anything, Mazer clarified
that Baker v Selden should be understood as a case concerning the appropriate scope of protection for
copyrighted works, an issue generally arising in the course of an infringement determination. See
Reichman, 42 Vand L Rev at 693-95 n288 (cited in note 2).
71. The unprotectability of abstract ideas is the proposition for which a number of courts have
recently cited Baker v Selden. See, for example, Cable/Home Communication Corp. v Network Productions,
Inc., 902 F2d 829, 842 (11 th Cir 1990); Whelan, 797 F2d at 1236; Toro Co. v R & R Products Co., 787
F2d 1208, 1211-12 (8th Cir 1986); Apple Computer, Inc. v Formula Intl, Inc., 725 F2d 521, 524 (9th Cir
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infringe Selden's copyright when Baker wrote his own treatise, in his own
words, describing the special double-entry method of bookkeeping. '7 2 This
statement implies that the court in Paperback thought that Selden sued Baker
for copyright infringement because of similarities in the explanatory material
in Baker's and Selden's books. This was not so. Selden sued Baker for
copyright infringement because Baker's book contained sample ledger sheets
that were substantially similar in arrangement to those found in the Selden
book. 7 3 Baker v. Selden was, in other words, a "nonliteral similarity" or
"structure, sequence, and organization" case.7 4 To put it in a slightly
different way, Baker's book offered potential users of Selden's accounting
system a substantially similar "user interface" to that of Selden's.
A review of the parties' arguments in Baker v. Selden reveals the parallels
between the legal contentions in that case and those in Paperback. Selden, who
had won in the lower courts, was, in effect, arguing to the Court that there was
1984); Atari, Inc. v Midway Mfg. Co., 672 F2d 607, 615 (7th Cir 1982); Rubin v Boston Magazine Co., 645
F2d 80, 82 (1st Cir 1981); Reyher v Children's Television Workshop, 533 F2d 87, 90 (2d Cir 1976).

Mazer v Stein, 347 US at 217, does seem to give Baker v Selden as an illustration of the copyright
principle that. copyright protection is available only for the expression of an idea, not the idea itself.
Professor Nimmer relied on this aspect of Mazer to argue that Baker v Selden should be understood as
limited to the idea-expression distinction. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18[D] (cited in note 70).
Professor Reichman has pointed out that the idea-expression distinction preexisted Baker v Selden,
and if that was all the case represented, it would have been superfluous at the time it was rendered.
Reichman has also observed that the important historical role of Baker v Selden "was to override the
exclusive reproduction rights as applied to utilitarian works . . . [when] the standard defenses
(including idea-expression) appeared insufficient to guarantee that a third party's right to use
functional features embodied in the work .. " Reichman, 42 Vand L Rev at 693 n288 (cited in note
2).
That Mazer did not mean by this reference to Baker v Selden to effect a radical change in the
meaning of that case is demonstrated by the fact that, in the same paragraph as its discussion of Baker
v Selden, Mazer cited approvingly two other cases in which defendants had copied the functional
designs depicted in plaintiffs' copyrighted drawings by constructing the functional work depicted in
the drawing. The courts in these two cases applied the principles of Baker v Selden in ruling that the
copyright had not been infringed. See Muller, 43 F Supp 298 (design for controlling the flow of
automobile traffic approaching a bridge not protectable by copyright in drawings); Fulmer v United
States, 103 F Supp 1021 (Ct Cl 1952) (copyright in drawings depicting design for parachutes not
infringed by manufacture of parachutes embodying the design), cited in Mazer, 347 US at 217 n39.
These cases indicate that by failing to seek patent protection for the functional designs depicted in
the drawings, plaintiffs had lost the right to exercise control over the functional implementation of
the design by others. Muller, 43 F Supp at 299-300; Fulmer, 103 F Supp at 1022. For further
discussion of how Baker v Selden has been understood over time, see Reichman, 42 Vand L Rev at
693-695 n288 (cited in note 2).
72. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 54. It is a small point, but neither Baker nor Selden had written a
"treatise" on this accounting method. The Court described Selden's book as consisting of "an
introductory essay explaining the system of bookkeeping referred to, to which are annexed certain
forms or blanks, consisting of ruled lines and headings, illustrating the system and showing how it is
to be used and carried out in practice." Baker v Selden, 101 US at 100.
73. That Baker's ledger sheets were substantially similar to Selden's can be discerned from the
Supreme Court's observation that if Selden's copyright extended to the accounting system, the Court
would agree that Baker's book infringed the copyright. Baker v. Selden, 101 US at 100. The court
stated that Baker's work "use[d] a similar plan so far as the results are concerned; but makes a
different arrangement of the columns, and use[s] different headings." Id.
74. Neither in Paperback nor in the Whelan decision, discussed in notes 30-52 and accompanying
text, was there any recognition that Baker v Selden was a nonliteral similarity or SSO case in which the
SSO was ruled outside the scope of copyright.
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original expression 75 in the selection, ordering, and arrangement of the
columns and headings of the ledger sheets contained in his copyrighted
book. 76 That such elements could be protected by copyright law was evident,
Selden argued, from cases involving maps, charts, and diagrams, 7 7 among
others. 78 Selden insisted that Baker's arguments about "uncopyrightable
subject matter" simply missed the point.
In support of his "uncopyrightable subject matter" defense, Baker pointed
out that Selden had gone to the Patent Office to get patent protection for his
bookkeeping system. 79 Baker asserted that this demonstrated that the system
was not the proper subject matter of copyright, but should be protected, if at
all, by a patent.80 It was a contribution to the useful arts, Baker argued, not to
literature. Baker insisted that the ledger sheets conveyed no thought,
provided no information, and expressed no idea over and above the system
8
they embodied. '
Baker relied on some cases denying copyright protection to forms,8 2 as
well as on the Court's then very recent decision in The Trademark Cases.83 In
that set of cases, the Court had very clearly distinguished between things that
were "writings" of "authors," and hence within the subject matter of
copyright, and those that were "inventions" in the "useful arts," which were
the province of the patent system.8 4 Baker argued that Selden, having been
unable to get a patent, should not use copyright to get indirectly the kind of
75. Selden's arguments are summarized in 25 LEd at 842, as well as described by the Court in
the body of the opinion. The Court understood Selden to be contending "that the ruled lines and
headings, given to illustrate the system, are a part of the book, and, as such, are secured by the
copyright: and that no one can make or use similar ruled lines and headings, made and arranged on
substantially the same system, without violating the copyright." 101 US at 101.
76. See notes 139-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of selection, ordering and
arrangement of categories of information in forms cases.
77. See synopsis of Selden's argument, 25 LEd at 842.
78. The Court's opinion indicates that Selden relied heavily on Drury v Ewing, a case in which
copyright was claimed in a chart of patterns for clothing. Baker v Selden, 101 US at 107. The Court
questioned the Drury decision, but concluded that in any event it was not a controlling case. Id.
79. That Baker relied on this point is demonstrated in the summary of his argument in 25 LEd at
841. The Court's opinion indicated that no patent issued on Selden's system. 101 US at 104. The
opinion does not reveal whether the patent was denied or merely withdrawn.
80. More recent cases would suggest that Selden's system was not patentable subject matter
because it was a business method, see, for example, Ex Parte Murray, 9 USPQ2d (BNA) 1819 (PTO Bd
Ap 1988), although one case suggests the method might be patentable if carried out by computer.
See Paine, Webber,Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 564 F Supp 1358 (D
Del 1983).
81. See synopsis of Baker's argument preceding the Court's opinion. 25 LEd at 841.
82. Id at 842. See also 101 US at 106-07 for the court's discussion of a case that had denied
copyright protection to a cricket scoring sheet.
83. 100 US 82 (1879). In that opinion, the Court ruled that the constitutional clause
empowering Congress to legislate to give exclusive rights to "authors" for their "writings" and to
"inventors" for their "discoveries" in the "useful arts" did not give Congress power to pass a
uniform national trademark statute. Baker's reliance on these cases is referred to at 25 LEd at 842.
84. The Trademark Cases, 100 US at 94. Interestingly enough, the Court's opinion in Baker v Selden
contains no direct reference to The Trademark Cases, although the Court's concern about not allowing
copyright law to be used to protect things in the patent domain is evident from the Baker v Selden
opinion, discussed in note 86 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court's
recent decision, Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S Ct 1282 (1991), relied heavily
on and quoted approvingly from both The Trademark Cases and Baker v Selden concerning the meaning
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protection that the Patent Office would not grant him directly. Even
embodied in a copyrighted book, the system still remained outside the subject
matter of copyright. As long as he wrote his own explanaiory material about
the system, Baker insisted that no copyright liability could arise from having
substantially similar ledger sheets in his book, for he needed to be able to
reproduce similar ledger sheets in order to illustrate the bookkeeping system
in his own book.
The Supreme Court overturned the ruling in Selden's favor and ordered
the complaint against Baker to be dismissed.8 5 The Court agreed with Selden
that he held a lawful copyright in the book he wrote explaining his accounting
system.8 6 But the Court agreed with Baker that the copyright in the book no
more gave its owner exclusive rights in the accounting system than the
copyright in a book on the composition and uses of medicines would give its
8 7
author exclusive rights over manufacture and application of the medicines.
To get exclusive rights for innovations of these sorts, an innovator had to go
to the Patent Office. "To give to the author of the book an exclusive property
in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been
officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the
province of letters-patent, not of copyright." 88 From copyright, the Court
insisted, an innovator could get only the exclusive rights to print and
distribute his book about the art.8 9
of originality in expression and authorship in copyright law, as well as what copyright law can

properly protect in a work.
85.

Baker v Selden, 101 US at 107.

86. Id at 101-02.
87. Id at 102. The Court noted that a book on an accounting system might "contain[] detailed
explanations of the art, [and] it may be a very valuable acquisition to the practical knowledge of the
community." Id. But this still did not make the detailed knowledge concerning the art a protectable
element of the copyrighted book. Id. The last substantive line of the recent Feist decision quotes
Baker v Selden on a similar point: " 'great praise may be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and
enterprise in publishing this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being rewarded in this
way.' " Feist, 11l S Ct at 1297, quoting Baker v Selden, 101 US at 105.
88. Baker v Selden, 101 US at 102. The Court pointed out that the novelty of the art being
described in the book has no relevance in determining the scope of copyright protection in the book.
Id. This aspect of the Court's opinion is worth noting because Paperback makes much of the
"unobviousness" of the Lotus interface as if it had significant bearing on the protectability of it by
copyright. The court even states that "obviousness" was one of five concepts to be considered in
analyzing a case such as Lotus v Paperback, 740 F Supp at 58. (The others were the idea-expression
distinction, functionality, originality, and merger. Id at 58-59.) "Obviousness" is an important
concept in patent law, but not in copyright law. The court's frequent references to "obviousness" in
Paperback indicate that the court may have been confused on this point. See, for example, Paperback,
740 F Supp at 58 (asserting that it would be wrong to deny copyright to the "most original and least
obvious" aspects of a work). Id at 65 (asserting that although the core idea of a spreadsheet program
was "functional and obvious," not "every possible method" of designing a spreadsheet program was
obvious, and originality in a copyright sense involved "pressing beyond the obvious"). Id at 66 (use
of "+" to represent addition was "obvious if not essential" (emphasis in the original)). Id at 68
(referring to the command structure of 1-2-3 as "original and nonobvious"). See also id at 79
(concerning the need to protect "strikingly innovative" aspects of programs by copyright). These
statements suggest that the court in Paperback had lost sight of a fundamental point of the Baker v
Selden opinion that the novelty (or nonobviousness) of Selden's accounting system had no bearing on
whether it was protectable by copyright law.
89. Baker v Selden, 101 US at 102-103. The Court explained:
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As all this pertained to Selden's claims, the Court reasoned that since
Selden's copyright did not give him any exclusive rights in the accounting
system, Baker was' free to put similar ledger sheets illustrating use of the
system in his book as well. To hold otherwise would indirectly give Selden
exclusive rights in his system that the Court regarded as improper to
recognize directly. 90 In effect, the Court decided that the selection, ordering,
and arrangement of these columns and items in the ledger sheets were
constituent parts of Selden's accounting system, and hence not a part of the
book's protectable expression. 9 '
The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give to the author an exclusive
right to the methods of operation which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he
employs to explain them, so as to prevent an engineer from using them whenever occasion requires.
The very object of publishing a book on science or useful arts is to communicate to the
world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be frustrated if the
knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book. And where the
art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or
such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the
art, and given therewith to the public ....
Id at 104 (emphasis added) (Much of this passage was quoted with approval in Feist, 111 S Ct at
1290.). The Court indicated that the "useful art" was not protectable regardless of whether it was
explained in a book or illustrated by diagrams: "Those illustrations are the mere language employed
by the author to convey his ideas more clearly. Had he used words of description instead of diagrams
(which merely stand in the place of words) there could not be the slightest doubt that others, applying the art to
practical use, might lawfully draw the lines and diagrams which were in the author's mind, and which he
thus described by words in his book." Id (emphasis added).
Cases such as Whelan, 797 F2d 1222, assert that they are consistent with Baker v Selden because if a
particular detail of a program is necessary to achievement of a program's general purpose or
function, idea/expression merger will be found. See note 40 and accompanying text. Indeed, the
Third Circuit in Whelan purported to derive its test from Baker v Selden, id at 1235-36. Whelan,
however, fundamentally misconstrues the larger meaning of Baker v Selden. The Whelan test would
give "functional works" a far broader scope of copyright protection than would be available to
artistic and fanciful works, a result out of keeping with traditional principles of copyright law. See
notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
90. Baker v Selden, 101 US at 104-05. The court noted that the plausibility of Selden's claim
arose from the nature of the work the case involved: "In describing the art, the illustrations and
diagrams employed happen to correspond more closely than usual with the actual work performed
by the operator who uses the art." Id at 104. While in most instances useful arts were embodied in
wood, metal, or stone, the peculiar art this case involved was embodied in a writing. But, the Court
announced, "the principle is the same in all. The description of the art in a book, though entitled to
the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself." Id at 105.
91. This review of Baker v Selden helps to explain why the court in Synercom, 462 F Supp 1003,
ruled that the manner in which Synercom had formatted data for input to its structural analysis
program for engineering projects was a constituent part of the "idea" or "method" of the program.
The Synercom opinion reflects that there were more than three million ways to order the data for input
into the structural analysis program. Id at 1012. That did not, however, mean that there were three
million ways to order the data that would be sound from an engineering standpoint for conducting
structural analyses. If the data were ordered in accordance with a method Synercom had devised, the
ordering of the data would very likely be inextricably interconnected with the method, and under
Baker v Selden, would be part of the work's idea. This appears to be the basis of the court's ruling in
Synercom.
Paperback, 740 F Supp at 55, characterizes the "central proposition" of Synercom as though
nonliteral sequencing should always be treated as a circumstance in which idea and expression have
merged. This is not the case, for, in a footnote, the court in Synercom indicated that in a proper case
nonliteral elements of computer programs might be protectable by copyright. 462 F Supp at 1013
n5. Synercom did recognize, however, that in some cases the ordering of data might be reflective of a
method, and when it was, the sequence was outside the scope of copyright. In the usual case, said the
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Given that Baker may have made his sample ledger sheets somewhat
different from Selden's out of fear that making them identical would almost
inevitably bring on a lawsuit, it is worth inquiring whether there is anything in
the Court's opinion suggesting that it would have ruled differently if Baker
had copied Selden's ledger sheets exactly, column for column, heading for
heading. The question has a clear bearing on the implications of Baker v.
Selden for the Paperback dispute which involved at least some exact copying.
The last substantive statement of the Baker v. Selden opinion directly answers
this question: "[t]he conclusion to which we have come is, that blank accountbooks are not the subject of copyright; and that the mere copyright of
Selden's book did not confer upon him the exclusive right to make and use
account-books, ruled and arrangedas designated by him and described and illustratedin
said book." 9 2 The Court's decision, then, did not rest on a finding that Baker's
ledger sheets were different enough from Selden's that they did not infringe.
The Court ruled that Selden's ledger sheets were simply not protectable by
copyright law, just as Baker asserted.
While a later section of this article will question whether there was
sufficient expressiveness in the Lotus command structure to render it a
protectable feature of the Lotus program, 93 the next subsection will explain
why Paperback itself suggests that this aspect of the Lotus interface was a
constituent part of a "system" that, under section 102(b), should have put it
outside the scope of copyright law. The subsection will concentrate on the
macro language issue because of the stronger indication in the opinion that
this was a system whose elements had to be copied in order for others to use
and "express" the same system. The court should also have inquired whether
the Lotus command structure was a component of the larger Lotus system for
managing spreadsheet functions, one that other spreadsheet program
94
developers might have needed to copy in order to use the same system.
court, "sequenc[ing), choice, and arrangement have only stylistic significance, rather than constituting
as they would here, the essence of the expression." Id at 1014 (emphasis added).
92. Baker v Selden, 101 US at 107 (emphasis added). It would have been easy for the Court to
have disposed of the case by saying that Baker's ledger sheets were different enough to be
noninfringing. The Court, however, decided to tackle the more difficult problem presented by the
case about whether the ledger sheets as illustrative of the bookkeeping system were protectable by
copyright. Its decision that the ledger sheets were part of the system, and hence unprotectable by
copyright law, has deeply shaped American copyright law. See note 70.
One thing that is somewhat archaic about Baker v Selden is the emphasis both the parties and the
Court gave to the issue of "copyrightability" of the subject matter at issue in the case. See notes 7991 and accompanying text. See also notes 27-29 and accompanying text. At the time Baker v Selden
was handed down, courts had not yet recognized news reports or advertisements as copyrightable
subject matter. See 101 US at 105-06. It is partly because these classes of works were later ruled to
be copyrightable subject matter that Baker v Selden is in need of an updated interpretation. See, for
example, Bleistein v Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 US 239, 251 (1903) (advertisement was
copyrightable); InternationalNews Service v Associated Press, 248 US 215, 234 (1918) (reflecting view that
AP newspapers could have been copyrighted).
93. See notes 133-157 and accompanying text. See also note 150, which will suggest that
irrespective of the macrocommand language issue, the Lotus commands may still have been
constituent parts of the Lotus spreadsheet system.
94. It is beyond the scope of this article to deal at length with Paperback's "standardization"
defense. Other commentators have dealt with "standardization" defenses in computer program

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

B.

[Vol. 55: No. 2

The Macrocommand Language as a System

The original Lotus complaint asserted that the command and macro
language and syntax of the 1-2-3 interface were protectable by copyright
law. 9 5 Although the syntax claim seems not to have been directly pressed at
trial, 96 it is evident from Paperback that Lotus was still asserting that the
macrocommand language was protectable. 97 Paperback attempted to counter
this claim by arguing that languages were unprotectable by copyright law and
by offering evidence to show that the Lotus macro facility involved a
language. 98 In view of the court's sharply negative reaction to the defense, 99
copyright cases at greater length. See, for example, Karjala, 28 Jurimetrics J at 33 (cited in note 31);
Menell, 41 Stan L Rev at 1045 (cited in note 6); Stern, 14 Colum-VLAJ L & Arts at 283 (cited in note
13); Comment, 52 U Pitt L Rev at 689 (cited in note 13). Economists have argued that copyright law
should be applied to computer program user interfaces so as to promote standardization. See, for
example, Joseph Farrell, Standardizationand Intellectual Property, 30JurimetricsJ 35 (1989); Menell, 41
Stan L Rev at 1045 (cited in note 6).
The court in Paperback was surely wrong to say that there was no copyright precedent to support
recognition of a standardization defense. 740 F Supp at 79. A number of computer program
copyright cases have regarded elements of user interfaces as unprotectable for reasons consistent
with a standardization defense: some because the elements had become conventional to programs of
the sort the case involved, see, for example, Telemarketing Resources v Symantec Corp., 12 USPQ2d
(BNA) 1991 (ND Cal 1989); some out of concern for users who otherwise would have to be retrained,
see, for example, Synercom, 462 F Supp 1003; and some because market factors required commonality
in user interfaces, see, for example, Plains Cotton, 807 F2d 1256. See also Kepner-Tregoe, 203 USPQ
(BNA) at 132 (discussing how market factors can narrow the range of available expressions). In the
context of traditional kinds of literary works (novels and plays), the scenes d faire doctrine is a
comparable defense. See Paperback, 740 F Supp at 59 (recognizing the scines dfaire doctrine).
What may have made Paperback's argument so difficult for the court to accept was that it was an
argument that virtually all of the Lotus interface had become a standard. Intellectual property
scholars who reached consensus on many user interface issues at the LaST Frontier Conference were
unable to reach consensus on what if any weight should be given to standardization concerns in
analyzing copyright infringement claims involving user interfaces. LaST Frontier Report, 30
Jurimetrics J at 28, 31 (cited in note 6).
95. See Complaint of Lotus Development Corp., discussed in note 18 and accompanying text.
That the "language" defense was one of Paperback's principal defenses is evidenced by the extensive
treatment given to the issue in its pretrial brief. See Pretrial Brief of Defendants Paperback Software
Intl and Stephenson Software, Ltd., Lotus Development Corp. v PaperbackSoftware Intl, CA No 87-0076-K
30-43 (Feb 1, 1990).
In the course of the litigation, Lotus seems to have downplayed the language claims, focusing
more attention on the "command structure" issue for which it may have been easier to find helpful
copyright precedents and on the protectability of the user interface as a whole.
96. Syntax is, by definition, a set of abstract rules which must be followed for statements in a
language to be meaningful. Since it is well established that "rules" are not protectable by copyright
law (see, for example, Morrissey v Proctor & Gamble, 379 F2d 675), a direct claim for the Lotus syntax as
a copyrightable element of the program would be on shaky grounds. Lotus syntax, because of its
import in the ordering of commands in the command structure, remained indirectly in the case. For
the court's recognition of this, see note 101 and accompanying text. That syntax affects semantics
can be easily demonstrated with an example in the English language. "The dog bit the man" has a
different meaning than "the man bit the dog," notwithstanding the fact that both sentences have the
same words. The meanings differ because of English syntactic rules about the placement of subjects
of sentences vis- -vis verbs and other parts of the predicate.
97. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 63.
98. Professor Harry W. Lewis of the Harvard University Computer Science Department
submitted an affidavit directed to this issue to support Paperback's defense.
99. The court's lack of regard for this argument is best revealed by the fact that the "language"
defense is only discussed at the end of the opinion in a section of the opinion entitled "A Postscript
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it would seem that the defense may not have been focused enough to aid the
court in appreciating its copyright significance.
Had the court understood that the language defense was, in fact, a section
102(b) "system" defense, it might not only have integrated the analysis of this
issue into the body of an infringement analysis, but might even have been able
to perceive the connection between this defense and the command structure
issue that was so central to the ruling in Paperback.
Paperback contains two paragraphs describing the macro facility of Lotus 12-3. This discussion reveals that the court understood how users of the Lotus
program could use the Lotus commands to construct macros in order to adapt
the program to serve their needs better:
Rather than going step-by-step through the same sequence of commands each time
there is a need to perform a particular function, the user may store a sequence of
command terms as a "macroinstruction," commonly called a "macro," and then, with
one command stroke that invokes the macro,
00 cause the programmed computer to
execute the entire sequence of commands.'

The Lotus commands could, in other words, be used as building blocks for
construction of these macros, which is why they could accurately be called
elements of a language. After noting that macros could be built not only by
combining Lotus command terms into sequences, but also by combining
function keys and other aspects of the interface into the sequences, the court
goes on to make this very revealing statement: "[b]ecause macros may
contain many menu choices, the exact hierarchy-or structure, sequence, and
organization-of the menu system is a fundamental part of the functionality of the
macros." 101
This statement demonstrates that the court recognized that the structure
of the commands was part of the Lotus macro system, which, if one was taking
section 102(b) seriously, would need to be regarded as outside the bounds of
on the Nature of Decisionmaking in This Case" under a subsection entitled "Strained Analogies and
Word Games." Paperback, 740 F Supp at 71.
As with Paperback's functionality defense, the court was critical of Paperback's attorneys for
failing to make a coherent statement of the language defense, see note 163, and ultimately made its
own statement of the argument underlying this defense. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 72. The court
offered several reasons for regarding the argument as flawed, id at 72-73, among them, that the
defendants "though invited at trial to do so, have cited no precedent that supports [this] contention
....
Id. But see note 107. The court thought that the argument depended on "arbitrary
definitions of words, adopted for undisclosed reasons," and concluded that this defense was "totally
without merit." Id.
Earlier sections of Paperback mention machine, assembly, and higher order computer languages.
Id at 44-45. There is no mention of these kinds of languages in the subsection discussing
Paperback's functionality defense. The court may, however, have regarded the Lotus commands as
too different from these other kinds of languages to be a comparable phenomenon. If, as a matter of
computer science, the Lotus macro facility contained elements satisfying the formal definition of
"language," the court should have taken the defense seriously.
100. Idat64.
101. Id at 65 (emphasis added). See note 96 concerning the embedding of syntax in the Lotus
command structure. See also Paperback, 740 F Supp at 78 (referring to Lotus's "command facility"
and "macrocommand facility," and the availability of "translation devices" to allow 1-2-3 macros to
be converted in other programs). The statement quoted in the text was made in a section of the
opinion describing the Lotus interface, id at 63-65, and before any discussion of what the court
considered to be copyrightable expression in the interface.
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copyright protection.' 0 2 No further reference to this issue can be found in the
court's analysis of the "copyrightability" of the Lotus 1-2-3 interface or of the
lawfulness of Paperback's copying of elements of the interface. Nor is there a
reference to this issue in the part of the opinion discussing the language
03

defense. 1

Even apart from this statement, Paperback's language defense should have
been taken more seriously. By definition, a language is a formal system
consisting of three elements: a vocabulary, a syntax, and semantics.104 There
was evidence in the record demonstrating that, as a matter of computer
science, the Lotus commands could properly be understood to be elements of
a language.10 5 Paperback gives no reasons for its rejection of this evidence.
The court's treatment of the question of whether copyright protection is
available for a language leaves much to be desired. The court challenged
0 6
Paperback to find precedents to show that languages were uncopyrightable.
From Paperback's failure to find any, the court seems to have inferred that the
defense had no merit. Instead, the court might have insisted that Lotus
affirmatively prove that languages are copyrightable, or, in the alternative, it
might have recognized that Lotus was bringing forth a novel question of law
for it to decide. Either choice likely would have led to a clearer understanding
of the copyright issues raised by this assertion.
There is some copyright precedent that might support the view that
languages are, in fact, not protectable by copyright law even when embodied
in the texts of copyrighted works. The "shorthand system" cases, like the
Paperback case, involved claims to language components used in the practice
of the plaintiffs' systems.1 7 The courts in these cases have, with the
obligatory nods to Baker v. Selden, denied plaintiffs the protection they sought
from copyright law. None of these cases is discussed in the subsection on the
language defense. i08 Nor does the court mention the views of a number of
102. There was no reference to section 102(b) in the part of the opinion that discusses the
language defense. Properly understood, Paperback's "compatibility" argument should be seen as a
component of the "language as system" defense. See notes 110-112 and accompanying text for a
discussion of compatibility issues.
103. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 73-75.
104. See Inst of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE"), Standard Dictionary of Electrical and
Electronic Terms 478 (IEEE, 3d ed 1984). See generally Richard H. Stem, On Copyright in Computer
Languages, 17 Rutgers Computer & Tech LJ 321 (1991).
105. See note 98. Moreover, Lotus itself had referred to 1-2-3's command menu and macro
language as protectable elements of the Lotus interface. See note 18 and accompanying text.
106. 740 F Supp at 72.
107. See, for example, Brief English Systems, 48 F2d 555 (finding no copyright infringement where
similarities between the plaintiff's and defendant's works were attributable to their being about the
same shorthand system, citing Baker v Selden, 101 US 99); Griggs v Perrin, 49 F 15 (same). See also
Signo Trading Intl v Gordon, 535 F Supp 362 (translation system not protectable by copyright). But see
Nikanov v Simon & Schuster, Inc., 246 F2d 501 (2d Cir 1957) (finding infringement of a Russian
alphabet and language guide).
108. This part of Paperback makes a passing reference to the "coined words" of Reiss v National
Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F 717 (SDNY 1921), but does not discuss the case. Reiss was an
uncharacteristically terse opinion written by then District Judge Learned Hand in which the court
upheld the validity of a copyright in a compilation of coined words intended to enable purchasers of
the book to encode their communications to other persons via cable. It was, in short, a book

Page 311: Spring 1992]

A

CRITIQUE OF PAPERBACK

commentators who have opined that computer languages should be regarded
as unprotectable by copyright law. 10 9
Analysis of Paperback's "compatibility" defense should also have been
integrated with the "language-as-system" defense."l 0 The macro facility of
the Lotus program allows users with complex computational needs to create
"libraries" of macros that allow rapid single stroke execution of the sequences
necessary to accomplish these tasks. Whole books have been written to advise
consisting of a possible vocabulary without syntax or semantics. Brief English Systems v. Owen, 48 F2d
555 (2d Cir 1931), decided ten years after Reiss and by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
seems a more apposite precedent, given its more linguistic character.
Compilations have long been troublesome for copyright law, and the temptation to protect them
on account of the work that was required to prepare them has proved very strong over the years, as
demonstrated by Reiss and the long line of "sweat of the brow" cases recently rejected as erroneous
interpretations of copyright law in Feist, 111 S Ct 1282, 1292-95. Still, copyright does have a long
history of protecting compilations. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:
Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 Colum L Rev 1865 (1990).
109. For commentators expressing this view before Paperback issued, see, for example, John P.
Sumner, The Copyright/PatentInterface: Patent Protectionfor the Structureof Code, 30JurimetricsJ 107, 112
(1989); Leo J. Raskind, The Uncertain Case For Special Legislation ProtectingComputer Software, 47 U Pitt L
Rev 1131, 1174 (1986); Richard H. Stern, The Bundle of Rights Suited To New Technology, 47 U Pitt L Rev
1229, 1239 n64 (1986); Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?:" Determining the Scope of Copyright
Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 Mich L Rev 866 (1990) (authored by Steven R.
England). This Note was cited in Paperback, 740 F Supp at 53. It asserts that the Synercom decision
was correct because the input formats for Synercom's format were a language: "Thought of in this
way, Synercom was an easy case, for there can be no more protection for input formats than for the
English language itself." Id at 882 n82. See also Stem, 14 Colum-VLAJ L & Arts at 283 (cited in
note 13); Comment, 39 Emory LJ at 1293 (cited in note 13).
110. Discussion of Paperback's compatibility defense can be found at Paperback, 740 F Supp at 69,
77-79. Paperback argued that in order to develop a commercially viable spreadsheet program, it was
"necessary" for its program to be "compatible" with Lotus. Copying the Lotus command hierarchy
was said to be necessary to achieve compatibility. The court found it easy to dispense with this
argument by pointing out that there were other commercially viable spreadsheet programs that had
different command structures than Lotus, and hence Paperback had not proven the necessity of
copying. Id at 69. (It is worth noting that the court had found "necessity" as to some features of the
Lotus interface, such as the use of the "" to invoke the command menus and the rotated "L" grid,
despite the fact that there were programs on the market with different ways of doing these functions.
See notes 49-50 and accompanying text.)
Yet the opinion goes on to suggest that if Paperback had copied the Lotus commands in a more
indirect or inefficient manner-as by using a help facility to inform users what the equivalent
Paperback command was for each Lotus command, or having a macrocommand conversion facility
like that used by Excel-it might have achieved compatibility in an acceptable manner. Id. Use of
one of these alternative ways to achieve compatibility would, of course, have also involved a
significant degree of copying of the command structure of Lotus's interface. Yet, the court
suggests-without saying so directly-that it would have ruled this more indirect and inefficient
copying to be legal. Although the court identifies these two seemingly noninfringing ways to achieve
compatibility, the court's "necessity" test, as stated earlier in the opinion, seemed to recognize that
the existence of only a small number of alternative ways to do something would satisfy the merger
test. See id at 66. Merely two alternatives to Paperback's copying of the command structure does
not seem to be more than a small number of alternatives.
From a user's standpoint, the inefficiency of having to call on a help screen to identify which VPPlanner commands were equivalent to which Lotus commands seems an unwarranted nuisance,
requiring difference for difference's sake, rather than because of some expressive quality in the
command terms. See Kepner-Tregoe, 203 USPQ (BNA) 124. Recall that the Supreme Court in Baker v
Selden indicated it would have ruled no differently in that case had Baker copied Selden's ledger
sheets exactly. See note 90 and accompanying text. A recent case ruling that competitors were not
required to engage in inefficient copying when traditional principles of federal intellectual property
law would regard the copied aspect of the work to be unprotectable was Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US 141 (1989).
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users on how to construct macros for specific kinds of functions for Lotus 1-23."' After investing considerable time and energy in the creation of macros,
users will naturally want to continue to be able to use these macros, and
perhaps to share them with others with whom they may be working and who
may or may not have a Lotus program on their computers.
"Compatibility"' " 2 with the Lotus program, in essence, would allow users
with macro libraries to continue to enjoy the fruits of their own labor by
allowing them to "port" over to another spreadsheet program the macros
they have constructed. As the court's description of the Lotus macro facility
reveals, the exact same hierarchy of commands as 1-2-3 must exist in another
program for macros built in the 1-2-3 system to function at all. While the
macro facility of 1-2-3 is a highly useful aspect of the Lotus program-one
that might well be patentable under today's standards for computer programrelated inventionsI 3-it is, at base, a system, and, for this reason, should be
deemed to be outside the scope of copyright protection. To the extent the
command structure is an essential component of the macro facility, it too may
be outside the scope of copyright protection.
Only if the court determined that there was "expression" in the Lotus
interface, over and above the role of significant components of it in the macro
system, could it, consistently with the traditional principles of copyright law,
111. See, for example, David P. Ewing, 1-2-3 Macro Library (Que Corp, 3d ed 1990).
112. "Compatibility" has been heatedly debated as a computer program copyright issue both in
the United States and abroad. The issue arises both as to "internal interfaces" of computer
programs and as to "user interfaces" of programs. From the standpoint of the technical community,
the compatibility issues raised by both are much the same, even though copyright lawyers tend to
treat them as somewhat more distinguishable. See, for example, LaST FrontierReport, 30JurimetricsJ
at 21-22, 26-31 (cited in note 6).
Some think that copyright law should be interpreted so that "interfaces" would be "ideas" and
only the code implementing them should be considered copyrightable "expression." Under this
view, if one firm copies the interface of another firm (at least nonfanciful aspects of it) in order to
make a compatible product, no copyright infringement should be found. See, for example, Karjala,
28JurimetricsJ 33 (cited in note 31); Michael A.Jacobs, Copyright and Compatibility, 30JurimetricsJ 91
(1989). Others regard interfaces as valuable "nonliteral" elements of copyrighted programs, the
copying of which should be treated as an appropriation of "expression." There is, in this view, no
"right" under copyright law to make a "compatible" product. See, for example, William T. Lake,
John H. Harwood & Thomas P. Olson, Tampering With Fundamentals: A Critique of Proposed Changes in
EC Software Protection, 6 Computer L 1 (Dec 1989).
The recently adopted European Directive on copyright protection for computer programs
recognizes that interfaces may be unprotectable "ideas" of computer programs, and allows such
interfaces as are necessary to achieve interoperability to be copied without copyright liability. See
Council of the European Communities Directive on the Protection of Computer Programs, reproduced in 42
Patent, Trademark & Copyright J (BNA) 109 (May 23, 1991). The case law in the United States is
somewhat more mixed on this question. See cases discussed in the articles cited earlier in this note.
The court in Paperback must have been aware of the larger debate over the "compatibility" issue, yet
the opinion does not refer to this debate or to the case law that addresses the issue.
113. Although the case law status on the patentability of computer program-related inventions is
somewhat unclear, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has been taking a broad view of the
patentability of such inventions. The Lotus macro facility would seem to qualify for patent
protection under recently issued guidelines. See PTO Report on Patentable Subject Matter: Mathematical
Algorithms and Computer Programs, 38 Patent, Trademark, & Copyright J (BNA) 563, 569-71 (1989).
Concerning the case law on this issue, compare Donald S. Chisum, The Patentabilityof Algorithms, 47 U
Pitt L Rev 959 (1986); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protectionfor
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-RelatedInventions, 39 Emory LJ 1025 (1990).
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find infringement in Paperback. It is to the question of whether there was
anything expressive in the Lotus interface that we now turn.
V
WHAT WAS "EXPRESSIVE"

ABOUT THE LOTUS INTERFACE?

Determining what in a copyrighted work is "idea" and what is
"expression" can be among the most difficult conceptual tasks faced by
federal judges. For many kinds of works, such as novels and dramatic plays,
there are numerous precedents through which a judge may search to find
comparable situations to serve as a basis for making a judgment on the matter
before him or her. In some cases, however, there is very little apart from
general principles of copyright law to give a court guidance about how a
particular case should be resolved. Judge Keeton perceived Lotus v. Paperback
to be such a case. The court found nothing in the statute, 1 4 the legislative
history, or the CONTU report that gave more than indirect guidance on the
issues. 1 5 In the court's view, there were no prior cases that presented
anything more than general similarities to the idea/expression problem the
6
court found in Paperback. 1
114. Notwithstanding the court's statements early on in the opinion about the starting place of
any analysis being the statutory language itself, the court only mentions the statutory definition of
"computer program" in a background section of the opinion, Paperback, 740 F Supp at 50, and pays
very little attention to § 102(b) (see notes 59-61 and accompanying text). The statutory definition of
"computer program" more clearly supports Paperback's position in the litigation than Lotus's (see
note 31 and accompanying text) as does the text of § 102(b) and the case law underlying it.
115. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 50 (CONTU did not directly address the issue presented in
Paperback). The opinion indicates that the court was aware of the differences of opinion among
CONTU commissioners and staff about CONTU's views as to whether nonliteral elements of
programs would be protected by copyright law. Id at 50-51. The opinion does not contain any
reference to the legislative history of the 1980 software amendments. The court does refer in the
legal background section to some statements from the legislative history of the 1976 Act concerning
section 102(b), id at 49; but as noted above in notes 59-61 and accompanying text, the court pays
very little attention to them, even though the text of § 102(b) and the legislative history concerning it
were directly relevant to the controversy.
There is one place in Paperback, apart from the early background sections, in which the court
makes use of legislative history to respond to a Paperback defense. In rejecting one of Paperback's
"policy" arguments, the court referred to the testimony of a witness at a legislative hearing during
the copyright revision process leading up to the 1976 Act. This witness had warned that copyright
protection for computer programs might have disastrous consequences for standardization in that
field. Id at 76. Because Congress decided to protect computer programs despite such warnings, the
court regarded Paperback's standardization argument to be contrary to congressional intent. This
statement, however, was made at the same hearing at which another witness, Professor Miller,
warned of dire consequences from protecting computer programs by copyright law unless Congress
adopted what became § 102(b) of the 1976 Act. See note 4. Given that Congress adopted § 102(b)
in response to the concerns stated at this hearing, it may be that Congress thought § 102(b) could be
used to address standardization concerns as well.
116. Although Paperback contains some sections in which prior computer program copyright cases
are either briefly summarized or quoted parenthetically (see, for example, id at 55), there is
remarkably little analysis of prior cases in the substantive sections of the opinion analyzing the
"copyrightability" of the Lotus interface and Paperback's copying of what the court found to be
copyrightable elements of the Lotus interface. Occasional references are made to other cases, but
only at a very general level. See, for example, id at 65 (brief reference to Nichols), id at 66 (citation to
MVorrissey), id at 67 (brief reference to Whelan), and id at 68 (brief reference to Midway/Bandai). The
only prior computer program case that is discussed in some depth is Softklone, 659 F Supp 449, whose
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The court regarded itself as left only with general principles of copyright
law and overall congressional objectives as to the protection of computer
programs with which to resolve the dispute." 1 7 In Judge Learned Hand's
"patterns of abstractions" test, the court said it found a framework for sorting
out idea from expression." t8 But the court got precious little help from the
lawyers in the case in conceptualizing what an abstractions scale for a
spreadsheet program might look like, and where on such a scale the Lotus
interface (and its important component, the command structure) was to be
found. Indeed, the court expressed frustration with the lawyers for taking
"extreme positions'''' 9 that gave it no aid in constructing the abstractions
scale. Lotus's lawyers apparently argued that every detail of its user interface
was "expressive" (because of different ways functions could be done), and
Paperback's lawyers argued that all aspects of the user interface were
"ideas."' 20 So, instead of building a fairly elaborate scale of abstractions, as
Hand's test suggested was proper,' 2 ' the court ended up with a dichotomy in
which the only perceived generality at the "idea" pole was that of the
electronic spreadsheet, and all of the particularities of the Lotus interface
were lumped together at the "expression" pole. 122
One of the traditional principles of copyright law that the court did not,
but should have, employed in constructing its framework for analysis of the
copyright issues was one that recognizes that the scope of a copyright (that is,
the breadth of protection it provides and how far down the scale of
abstractions it is appropriate to draw the line between idea and expression)
tends to vary according to the nature of the work under consideration. Over
the years, courts have come to perceive that there are differing levels of
"expressive" content in different kinds of works. Highly fanciful or artistic
holding that computer program menu screens were separate works from the program was rejected in
a section of the opinion discussing Paperback's subject matter jurisdiction defense. Paperback, 740 F
Supp at 80-81. Even the Whelan decision, whose test for infringement heavily influenced the court's
analysis of Paperback (see notes 36-52 and accompanying text), is not discussed much in the opinion.
117. The court discusses what it considered to be relevant general principles of copyright law at
740 F Supp at 51-52 and 58-62 and relevant congressional objectives and policies at 52-53 and 7379.
118. Nichols, 45 F2d at 121, quoted in Paperback, 740 F Supp at 60.
119. The court felt strongly enough about how little help it got from the lawyers that it devoted a
subsection of the opinion to the issue. Id at 62. The court complained that by taking extreme
positions, the lawyers had failed to aid the court in building an abstractions scale and assessing where
along that scale various aspects of the Lotus interface were to be found. It warned that the
"argument of an advocate who presses too far in one or the other of these [extreme] directions ...
will not only lose the argument advanced but also lose credibility for later advancing a more sensible
alternative that proposes a less extreme but still favorable position along the scale." Id. Although
the lawyers for both parties were criticized in this subsection for taking extreme positions, far more
criticism in the opinion is directed at the defense lawyers. Some of Paperback's most vigorously
asserted defenses were dismissed by the court as "word games." Id at 71-73, 79.
120. Id at 62.
121. See id at 60 (" 'Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out,' " quoting
Nichols, 45 F2d at 121 (emphasis added)).
122. The court found some aspects of the Lotus interface were "necessary" components of such
an interface, and were eventually ruled to be "ideas" as well. See notes 49-50 and accompanying
text.
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works are generally regarded as enjoying a broad scope of copyright
protection because of their predominantly expressive character.' 2 3 Factual
works generally have a narrower scope of protection; in order to further
copyright's constitutional purpose of promoting the growth and
dissemination of knowledge, the facts, theories, and other discoveries that
such works contain are considered outside the scope of copyright.124 Because
of this, there is generally less expressive content to be found in factual works
than in artistic or fanciful works. An even narrower scope of copyright
protection is available for functional writings, such as rulebooks, forms,
manuals for operating power plants, engineering drawings, and the like.' 2 5 In
general, only exact or near-exact copying of such works will be infringing, for
26
the contents of these kinds of works tend to be predominantly functional.'
Under the principles of Baker v. Selden and its progeny, this functional content
is outside the scope of copyright protection.' 2 7 Only if, and to the extent that
such works contain some "expressive" content, is copyright protection
available to their authors.
Although user interfaces of computer programs can be highly fanciful or
artistic in character-videogames being perhaps the clearest example-many
are more functional in character. Some may be too functional to be
protectable by copyright. 1 2 8 That this should be so is not surprising in view of
the fact that computer programs themselves are properly regarded as
functional writings,' 29 and the role of user interfaces is to provide users with
access to program functionalities.13 0 The aspects of user interfaces that are
most readily accommodated by copyright are those that display words and
symbols on computer screens. This explains why most of the user interface
copyright cases have focused their copyright analysis on "screen displays,"
that is, on similarities in wording or graphical elements on computer
123. Novels, dramatic plays, and cartoons are examples of works generally enjoying such a broad
scope of protection. See, for example, LaST FrontierReport, 30 Jurimetrics J at 18 (cited in note 6).
124. Biographies, histories, scientific reports, and fact compilations are among the works that
enjoy this "thinner" protection under copyright law. Id. See also Feist, Ill S Ct 1282, 1289
(indicating that copyright protection for fact compilations is "thin").
125. Elsewhere the author has distinguished between the truly functional character of computer
programs and the kinds of "functional writings" mentioned in the text. Samuelson, 1984 Duke LJ at
727-49 (cited in note 5). Manuals for operating power plants explain how the plant should be
operated; they do not in themselves operate the plant. The wording used to explain the plant
operations is the copyrightable "expression" in the manual. The details of plant operations
described in the manual are among the work's "ideas." The only "function" of the manual is to
convey information, a kind of function that does not disqualify a work from copyright protection.
See notes 164-170 and accompanying text. This is in contrast to a computer program written to
control the plant's operations which actually controls the functioning of the plant. The inherently
functional nature of programs is what make them so different from traditional categories of
copyrightable works.
126. LaST FrontierReport, 30 Jurimetrics J at 18-19 (cited in note 6). See also cases cited in note
70.
127. See note 70 and accompanying text.
128. One example of this might be the digital display panels of gas pumps. See LaST Frontier
Report, 30 Jurimetrics J at 27 (cited in note 6).
129. Id at 19.
130. See, for example, Bill Curtis, EngineeringComputer "Look and Feel". User Inte7face Technology and
Human Factors Engineering, 30 Jurimetrics J 51 (1989).
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screens.' 3 ' More abstract elements of user interfaces, such as the pairing of
particular functions to particular keys on the computer keyboard, have
generally been viewed as outside the copyright realm.' 3 2 By abjuring the
prior case law's focus on "screen displays" and embracing the copyrightability
of "user interfaces," the court in Paperback may have opened the door to a
considerable broadening of the scope of copyright protection for user

interfaces.
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131. See, for example, Whelan, 797 F2d 1222; Manufacturers Technologies, 706 F Supp 984;
Broderbund, 648 F Supp 1127.
132. See, for example, Manufacturers Technologies, 706 F Supp 984 (infringement based on
similarities in wording and placement of words on screens; similarities in navigational elements of
the user interface ruled not protectable); Telemarketing Resources, 12 USPQ2d (BNA) 1991 (rejecting
claims involving certain pairings of keys to functions).
133. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 79-80 (infringement said not to be based on screen display
similarities, but upon similarities in user interfaces). The court quotes Lotus's definition of the Lotus
user interface as including "such elements as 'the menus (and their structure and organization), the
long prompts, the screens on which they appear, the function key assignments, [and] the macro commands
and language.' " Id at 63 (emphasis added). As shown above in notes 49-50 and accompanying text,
the court found some aspects of the Lotus interface to be unprotectable by copyright.
Few issues of computer program copyright law have confused the courts (and the Copyright
Office) more than attempting to grasp the relationship between a computer program and a user
interface. To enable the reader to understand the potential significance of the Paperback ruling
concerning copyright protection for "user interfaces," it may be helpful to review how the issue had
previously been dealt with by the courts and the Copyright Office.
The story starts with the Copyright Office decision in the early 1980s to begin registering
videogame programs as audiovisual works. See, for example, Stern Electronics, Inc. v Kaufman, 669 F2d
852 (2d Cir 1982). Later, the Office began to issue separate registration certificates for the
videogame programs. See, for example, Williams Electronics, Inc. v Artic Intl, Inc., 685 F2d 870 (3d Cir
1982). Videogame case law distinguished between program and audiovisual copyrights; for in some
videogame cases, a defendant would be found to have infringed the audiovisual, but not the program
copyright; in other cases a defendant would be found to have infringed the program copyright, but
not the audiovisual copyright. Sometimes both kinds of infringements were found. See, for example,
Williams Electronics, 685 F2d 870; M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v Andrews, 783 F2d 421 (4th Cir 1986); Midway
Mfg. Co. v Strohon, 564 F Supp 741 (ND Ill 1983). Registration practices and case law of this sort
seemed to suggest that a firm needed one copyright to cover the program, and a second for whatever
aspects of the program might be displayed on the screen.
Whelan was the first nonvideogame computer program copyright case in which user interface
similarities became an issue. The trial court in Whelan relied heavily on similarities between the
screen displays produced by the plaintiff's and defendant's programs as a basis for concluding that
Whelan's copyright had been infringed. See Whelan, 609 F Supp at 1322. On appeal, Jaslow pointed
out that Whelan was not charging infringement based on screen display similarities. Rather, her
claim was that Jaslow had copied aspects of the underlying program. Jaslow noted that very
differently structured programs could produce substantially similar or identical screen displays, and
hence the trial judge had erred in relying on screen display similarities as the basis for finding
copyright infringement as to the underlying program. See Whelan, 797 F2d at 1242-45.
The Third Circuit agreed withJaslow's argument, but only up to a point. The court agreed that
relying solely on screen display similarities to prove infringement as to structural elements of the
underlying program would be error, but decided it was not error to consider screen similarities as
some evidence of copying of underlying program elements. Because there was other evidence in the
record that the court regarded as supporting Whelan's claim of copying of underlying structural
elements of the program, the appellate court affirmed the infringement ruling.
Broderbund, 648 F Supp 1127, was the next case in which user interface/screen display similarities
arose in a nonvideogame software copyright case. Here the infringement claim was based exclusively
on screen display similarities, specifically the choice and arrangement of command terms on a series
of menu screens for a printing program. Although the court was somewhat equivocal about whether
Broderbund had an audiovisual or a program copyright or both, it found comfort in the Whelan
decision, which it interpreted as a screen display similarity case. The court in Broderbund used the
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The Proper Kind of Expressiveness Inquiry

Notwithstanding Paperback's lengthy abstract discussion of the copyright
term "expression," there is virtually no discussion in it about what the court
found to be "expressive" in an important element of the Lotus interface, the
Whelan test for software copyright infringement. This allowed the court to sidestep the issue of what
kind of copyright it was dealing with.
Sofiklone, 659 F Supp 449, like Broderbund, involved claims of infringement based solely on user
interface/screen display similarities, that is, the arrangement of command terms on menu screens.
The judge in Sofiklone rightly pointed out that the court in Broderbund had misinterpreted Whelan by
characterizing it as a screen display similarity case. The Sofiklone court took more seriously the points
that different programs could produce the same screen displays and that substantially similar
programs could produce different screen displays than had the appellate court in Whelan. The court
in Sofiklone ruled that the program and the user interface were separate works requiring separate
copyrights, a result consistent with the videogame cases. Fortunately for the plaintiff, it had obtained
a separate copyright for its main menu screen as a compilation of terms. The court found
infringement because the defendant had arranged the command terms in the same way as the
plaintiff on one portion of the menu screen, and because the defendant had also used the same
highlighting and capitalization of the first two letters of the command terms as had the plaintiff.
(Interestingly, the court ruled that it was not an infringement to have the same set of command terms
as another program, but only to arrange them in the same way when they could be arranged
differently.)
Not surprisingly, the Softklone decision, insofar as it ruled that separate copyrights were necessary
to cover user interface elements of programs, made some software developers quite nervous. Soon
thereafter, the Copyright Office initiated an inquiry about the separate registration issue. See Notice
of Inquiry, 52 Fed Reg 28, 311 (1987). Although the Office held hearings at which witnesses
discussed reasons that separate registrations of programs and screen displays might be desirable, the
Office decided against separate registrations. This may have been more as a matter of administrative
convenience (thereby minimizing the number of forms the Office had to process) than because the
Office had definitively resolved the copyright dilemma about the proper characterization of the
relationship between computer programs and user interfaces. See Hearings Before U.S. Copyright
Office on Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays (Sept 9-10, 1987). Current
Copyright Office policy is that if the predominant character of a program is audiovisual (such as a
videogame), the program should be registered as an audiovisual work. If not, it should be registered
as a literary work. Regardless of which registration category is used, the Office considers the
program and its screen displays to be one work. The Office has left to the courts the task of deciding
what elements of the program or the user interface are protectable by copyright law. Notice of
Registration Decision: Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays, 53 Fed Reg 21,817
(1988).
This, then, was the state of the law on this issue when the Paperback case was decided. Paperback,
not surprisingly, relied on the Softklone decision to support its contention that the Lotus interface was
unprotected by the copyright Lotus had registered for the program. Lotus, of course, thought that
the Copyright Office's "one work" policy statement reflected the proper legal approach. Although
some aspects of the prior user interface case law supported Lotus's position, none of the prior cases
seemed to have been completely suitable to its purposes. Lotus seems to have decided to take a
bolder and more direct approach to litigating its copyright infringement claim against Paperback,
seeking protection not just for the screen displays 1-2-3 generated (the issue as to which the separate
registration controversy had arisen), but rather for its "user interface" as an important part of the
program.
The court was persuaded by Lotus that the user interface of Lotus 1-2-3 was a copyrightable
element of the program, the copying of which was unlawful. Paperback makes a point of
distinguishing its ruling in this respect from the prior user interface cases, particularly Softklone,
seeming to regard what it had done as breaking new ground for copyright law. This decision to
conceptualize the user interface as a protectable element of a program may help to explain why there
is so little discussion of or reference to the other user interface/screen display cases in Paperback.
Had the court not found the Lotus interface to be a copyrightable element of the Lotus program,
it is worth noting that Paperback might not have won the case as a whole. The opinion indicates that
the second phase of the trial would have determined whether Paperback copied copyrightable
elements from the source or object code of the Lotus program. See Paperback, 740 F Supp at 42.
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Lotus command structure. Although the opinion informs us at some length
about why certain features of the Lotus interface, such as the use of "+" to
represent addition, are not expressive enough to qualify for protection,1 34 it
does not explain its theory regarding the expressiveness of Lotus command
terms such as "worksheet," and "range," or about the expressiveness found

in the ordering of "range" after "worksheet" in the menu structure. 1 35
Indeed, the only comment the court made about why commands were
ordered as they were in the Lotus interface casts doubt on the view that the
arrangement was for expressive purposes. The opinion notes that the
command terms were "presented in order of predicted frequency of use
rather than alphabetically."' 1 36 This suggests the ordering was for functional
purposes.
The court did not inquire whether there were functional reasons for
grouping certain commands together, or putting some in lower levels of the
hierarchy. Nor did it ask whether there were other functional factors
constraining the design of the command structure or whether other elements
of the command structure were not, in fact, "original" to Lotus. 3 7 The court
relied heavily on the fact that Paperback could have done things differently to
This reflects a view of the relationship between the program and the user interface consistent with
that in Whelan.
It is interesting to note how much easier it is to conceptualize the relationship between other
kinds of machines and their user interfaces than to conceptualize the relationship between programs
and their user interfaces. Consider, for example, the relationship between the internal working parts
of a wristwatch machine and its user interface. The wristwatch (which consumers tend to consider in
an integrated way as consisting of the machine and its interface) often has a user interface consisting
of a face with numbers on it and two hands fixed at the center of the face. These aspects of the
watch's user interface not only present a visual appearance, but also display information in an
efficient manner (which we refer to as "telling" us "the time"). Another part of the user interface of
the watch is the externally visible device with which one can wind and set the watch to the proper
hour. This controls the functioning of the internal working parts, rather than displaying information.
134. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 66-67.
135. The second line of the Lotus and Paperback command menu displays is known as a "long
prompt." Id at 64. As a user moves the cursor along the first line of the menu, thereby highlighting
different first line commands, the long prompt line will display different information for each
highlighted command. Some long prompts are explanations of highlighted command terms. Others
display the next array of command choices that are available to the user if the user cares to invoke
them. Id. The explanatory long prompts are clearly more "expressive" in character than are long
prompts that display further menus of command choices. Yet, Paperback does not differentiate
between the explanatory and submenu long prompts in assessing the expressiveness of the Lotus
interface. The court does, however, observe that Paperback's explanatory long prompts are different
from Lotus's. Id at 70. See note 17 for other differences between the Lotus and Paperback user
interfaces.
136. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 67. It is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court would find an
ordering based on frequency of use significantly more expressive than the alphabetic ordering found
unexpressive in Feist, 111 S Ct 1282.
137. Although the court recognizes that the use of "!" to invoke command menus was actually
original to Dan Bricklin, a co-developer of the Visicalc program, which was the first successful
electronic spreadsheet program, the court disposes of Lotus's claim to the "/" on merger ground
rather than on ground that it was not original to Lotus. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 66. Although Lotus
later acquired the copyright in Bricklin's Visicalc program, at the time Lotus 1-2-3 was developed,
this feature of Visicalc was copied by the developers of Lotus 1-2-3. See Affidavit of Daniel S.
Bricklin, Lotus Development Corp. v Paperback Software Intl, CA No 87-0076-K at 22 (June 28, 1990). The
developers of Lotus 1-2-3 copied a number of other elements of the Visicalc user interface. Id at 3436. "In most cases, Lotus 1-2-3 uses the same [command] terms as Visicalc ...." Id at 34. See also
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support the 3 8 conclusion that the Lotus command structure was
"expressive."
That something can be done differently may be relevant to
an "expressiveness" inquiry, but insufficient to demonstrate what copyright
law considers to be "original expression."
One line of cases, presenting analogous copyright problems to this dispute
that the court does not mention, is the "blank form" cases.' 39 In these cases,
judges examine the forms in question to determine whether they are
expressive. When the forms contain explanatory material, courts will
generally find sufficient expressiveness to support copyright protection for
the form. 140 On the other hand, when the only text in the forms consists of
terse instructions or descriptors identifying categories of information to be
elicited when the form is used, courts will generally find insufficient "original
expression" to support a copyright. 14' Even though it may require some
intellectual effort to select which categories of information should appear on a
form and how these categories should be arranged, and even though there
may be many ways to do these things, courts still require more from a form
designer before the work can be considered an "original work of
authorship."

42

It is easy to identify expressive components in highly fanciful and artistic
user interfaces. In more functional interfaces, however, particularly those that
Christopher Barr, From Visicalc to 1-2-3, PC Magazine 169 (May 26, 1987) (showing how Lotus built
on the command structure of Visicalc).
138. See note 51 and accompanying text. Although the court recognized that some command
terms in the Lotus interface were "obvious or merge[d] with the idea," it stated that this did "not
preclude copyrightability for the command structure taken as a whole." Paperback, 740 F Supp at 67.
Without quarreling with this statement, it is still fair to ask what was expressive about the command
structure.
139. See, for example, Bibbero, 893 F2d 1104 (medical billing forms ruled uncopyrightable for
lack of conveyance of information); John H. Harland Co. v Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F2d 966 (11 th Cir
1983) (denying copyright protection to checkbook format); Janus Marketing Communications, Inc. v
Doubleday & Co., 569 F Supp 76 (SDNY 1981) (daily activity charts ruled uncopyrightable). These
cases are among many that trace the "blank forms" rule to Baker v Selden.
140. See, for example, Beardsley, 253 F2d 702 (pamphlet containing forms with explanatory
information held copyrightable).
141. See note 137. See also Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. v Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 14 USPQ2d
(BNA) 1829, 1832 (ED Pa 1990) ("The Safeguard day sheets are more innovative and sophisticated
than the ledger pages in Baker v Selden, and they do convey a certain amount of information. These
forms include certain visual guides to where some numbers should be recorded, but are not
sufficiently informative to be subject to copyright.").
142. See, for example, Bibbero, 893 F2d 1104 (despite a considerable amount of printing on a
medical form and the fact that the information could be arranged differently, the court found no
copyrightable expression). The Bibbero court acknowledged that cases interpreting the blank forms
rule "do not yield a consistent line of reasoning." Id at 1107. It distinguished one of the cases on
which the plaintiff relied and stated its disagreement with the ruling in another. Id. The court noted
that the Copyright Office had recently restudied the blank forms regulation, 37 CFR § 202.1(c).
Despite arguments made by blank forms suppliers about their need for copyright protection, it found
no persuasive argument for repealing this regulation and reaffirmed the continuing importance of
Baker v Selden as authority for the regulation. Id. The blank form suppliers were most likely relying
on the "sweat of the brow" cases which tested copyrightability by the hard work involved in
compiling facts as opposed to by originality. These, however, were recently spurned by the Supreme
Court in Fest, Ill S Ct 1282. In Feist, as in Bibbero, the Court took seriously the requirement that
there be something "expressive" to support copyright protection for the work.
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are command driven, it is more challenging to identify expressive elements. 43
Those who design functional interfaces, like those who design forms,
generally aim to maximize system efficiency and ease of use. 144 Designers
45
choose command names indicating the function the term represents.
When a program has several commands, designers limit the number of
command terms displayed at one time so that users are not overwhelmed and
confused with choices.' 46 This necessitates the creation of a hierarchy of
commands, with those of a more general character available higher up in the
menu of choices, and a grouping in submenus of commands with related
functions. 14 7 Such ordering requires intellectual effort, but it is a kind of
effort that resembles designing forms, and even more so, designing other
human-machine interfaces that are outside the bounds of copyright
protection.

48

1

One sign of how unexpressive the Lotus interface is and how little Lotus
has treated the 1-2-3 command structure as part of the work's expressive
authorship is the large number of books written about the Lotus program that
reproduce the Lotus commands and their arrangements, and explain how the
commands can be used to accomplish certain tasks. 149 If the Lotus command
structure is highly expressive, it would seem unnecessary for there to be so
many books explaining how to use the commands, navigate the structure, and
accomplish different kinds of spreadsheet functions. 50 Lotus, who asserted

against Paperback that reproducing these aspects of its interface is copyright
infringement, has not sued the authors of these books, even though they have
143. Explanatory long prompts and on-line help facilities are examples of expressive aspects of
the Lotus 1-2-3 interface. Graphical design elements of other user interfaces may also be expressive
enough to be protectable by copyright.
144. See Curtis, 30JurimetricsJ at 74 (cited in note 130) ("The importance of aesthetics relative
to other user interfaces increases with the importance of playfulness and decreases with the
importance of productivity.").
145. See, for example, Gary Perlman, NaturalArtificial Languages: Low Level Processes, 20 IntlJ ManMach Stud 373 (1984) (discussing choices of mnemonic names for commands).
146. See, for example, Margaret Gardner & Bruce Christie, eds, Applying Cognitive Psychology to User
Interface Design 268-69 (1987) (guidelines for screen design and organization).
147. See Id.
148. The design of cockpit control panels for airplanes or of dials and switches for monitoring the
safe operation of power plants also involve the arrangement of informational elements to facilitate
the proper functioning of machines. Yet these kinds of human-machine interfaces are not
protectable by copyright law because of the "useful article" doctrine of copyright law. See notes
164-170 and accompanying text.
149. There are more than two hundred listings in the current issue of Books in Print having "Lotus
1-2-3" in the title, among them: Bill Kling, The ABC's of Lotus 1-2-3 (Scott, Foresman, 1990); Ira
Krakow, Lotus 1-2-3: Self Taught (Brady Communications, 1989); Que Corp., Using 1-2-3 (Que Corp,
1987); Alan Simpson & Paul Lichtman, The First Book of Lotus 1-2-3, Release 2.2 (H.W. Sams & Co.,
1990); Mark Williams & Nelda M. Rinckenberger, Expert Advisor 1-2-3, Release 3.2 (-, 1990); Jeff
Woodward, Teach Yourself Lotus 1-2-3, Release 2.2 (Sybex, 1990).
150. This in itself suggests that the Lotus command structure is part of a "system" that the
program's developers had devised for performing a set of spreadsheet functions, even apart from the
role of the command structure in the macro facility. Whole chapters of the books listed in note 149
discuss specific commands. See, for example, Kling, The ABC's of Lotus 1-2-3 ch 9 (cited in note 149)
(lessons on moving, inserting, and deleting in 1-2-3).
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reproduced more of the Lotus commands and arrangements than Paperback,
which reproduced the Lotus command words only once per program.' 5 '
The Ninth Circuit recently ruled, in Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross,' 5 2 that a
spreadsheet program command structure was insufficiently expressive to be
protectable by copyright. Ross had collaborated with a colleague to develop a
spreadsheet program for the Macintosh computer. His job was to develop the
"engine" for the program, and his colleague's was to design the user
interface. In the process of developing the engine, Ross made a list of
commands that he thought should be included in the user interface, grouping
them in certain arrangements to represent the various menus the program
would have. After Ross and his colleague had a falling out, the colleague went
to work for Ashton-Tate and prepared a Macintosh spreadsheet program for
that firm. The Ashton-Tate product has a user interface in which, Ross
alleged, "[n]ot only are the individual commands identical to those of his
program [but] the order in which they are displayed and the menus in which
they are contained are identical to the command set ....

,,153

The district court ruled that Ross's "list of commands is only an idea that
is not protected under federal law."' 54 On appeal, Ross argued that in several
other cases, the ordering and arrangement of user interface commands had
been protected by copyright law. These cases emphasized the large number
of different arrangements that were possible. 155 The Ninth Circuit, however,
151. See, for example, Que Corporation Staff, Using 1-2-3 at 496-97 (cited in note 149); Williams,
Expert Advisor 1-2-3, Release 2.2 (cited in note 149) (showing representations of Lotus menu screens).
If Lotus sued the authors of these books for copyright infringement because they reproduced Lotus's
commands, command structure, and mode of presenting the commands, the authors would surely
defend themselves by asserting that they were merely explaining the Lotus spreadsheet system to
users. Lotus is, of course, unlikely to sue these authors. Precisely because the 1-2-3 interface is so
unexpressive (in a copyright sense), Lotus benefits from the efforts of authors who explain to users
how to implement various spreadsheet functions by interacting with the Lotus interface. Lotus
seems more concerned about protecting itself from competition in the electronic spreadsheet market
than in protecting the command structure more generally.
152. 728 F Supp 597 (ND Cal 1989), aff'd, 916 F2d 516 (9th Cir 1990).
153. Borland Brief at 51 (cited in note 17), quoting from Ross's Brief in Opposition to AshtonTate's Motion for Summary Judgment at 14. Following page 51 of the Borland brief is a photocopy
of the handwritten list Ross had developed.
154. Ross, 728 F Supp at 602. The district court stated:
The document given to Wigginton is only a list of labels for user commands, many of which
are common commands that were already available on other software programs. There is
nothing innovative or novel about the labels that Ross proposed Wigginton use for the
program or the order in which they are listed on the document. The single sheet of paper
does not contain any source code. The document clearly falls short of the threshold
separating ideas from expressions ....
Ross merely told Wigginton what tasks he believed
the interface should allow the user to perform.
Id. After stating that the list of commands was only an idea not protected by federal law, the court
cited 17 USC § 102(b). Id. See also NRC Report at 54 (cited in note 16) (expressing the doubts of
some software developers that a distinction between idea and expression can be made in program
user interfaces).
155. Borland Brief at 52 (cited in note 17). The cases cited include: Manufacturers Technologies,
706 F Supp 984 (developer's arrangement of items in a user interface held copyrightable
expression); Softklone, 659 F Supp 449 (status screen arrangement for computer program user
interface held protected by copyright); Broderbund, 648 F Supp 1127 (arrangement of terms on
computer screens protected).
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affirmed the district court ruling on this point.156 In the appellate court's
view, there was not a triable issue of fact regarding "expressiveness" in Ross's
set of user interface commands. The commands were simply the names of the
functions that the program was capable of performing, grouped in a way to
promote efficiency in using the program. It may require intellectual effort to
identify what functions the program should perform, and to group the
commands to facilitate efficient accomplishment of these tasks, but that does
not make the commands "expressive" in the way required to be afforded
copyright protection. 1 5 7 Thus, in light of this opinion, the existence of books
explaining Lotus commands and functional factors pertaining to command
structures makes the expressiveness of the Lotus command structure
questionable.
B.

Rethinking the Functionality of Computer Programs and User
Interfaces as It Bears on the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection

Perhaps because the lawyers' arguments also obscured this issue, Paperback
contains a muddled discussion about the functionality of computer programs
and user interfaces and the corresponding copyright implications. Nowhere
in the opinion is there recognition of the long-standing principle that the
58
scope of copyright protection for functional writings is quite narrow.'
156. Ross, 916 F2d at 521-22.
157. One way to perceive the abstractness of spreadsheet commands is by considering them as
"nonliteral" elements of a spreadsheet program. Each command can be viewed as standing at the
peak of the hierarchy of abstractions for the code that will implement that particular function. For
example, assume that command "Move" was associated with certain lines of the program source
code. The source code instructions themselves would be the "literal text" of the copyrighted
program. A detailed summary of the sequence of instructions might be a structural abstraction for
those lines of code which could accurately be described as a "nonliteral" element of the program.
Even more abstract (that is, less detailed) representations of this sequence might also be made which
would also be nonliteral in nature. The most abstract representation of the function for that segment
of the program would be the command name that would appear in the user interface. In this way of
understanding the command name, it is a "nonliteral" element of the program, but one of a much
more abstract character than those that might represent the underlying structure of the program.
See Alfred Z. Spector, Software, Interface, and Implementation, 30Jurimetrics J 79, 86 (1989) (a computer
scientist's discussion of the abstractness of user interfaces).
Thus, a command term is a very abstract representation of one function of the program. The
code associated with that one function could be written as a separate program. Because programs
are most valuable when they permit users to perform a number of related functions, mass-marketed
programs tend to consist of groups of functions. Those functions tend to be associated with a
command name (or symbol) that will be displayed on a screen as part of a user interface. Viewed in
this way, each command is a nonliteral element of a program, but is the kind of nonliteral element
that, properly understood, is an "idea." A user interface consisting of a set of command terms is a
list of ideas, as the Ninth Circuit correctly observed in Ross, discussed in notes 152-156 and
accompanying text. Unless it is copyright infringement for a program to have the same compilation
of functions as another program, user interface similarities involving arrangements of commands
may more often be at the "idea" level than the "expression" level.
158. See LaST Frontier Report, 30 Jurimetrics J at 18-19 (cited in note 6). The court treats
Paperback's argument that the scope of protection for computer programs should be narrow as if it
were a "policy argument" and consigns discussion of it to the "postscript" section of the opinion.
Paperback, 740 F Supp at 77-79. Treating the argument this way caused the court to consider it as an
argument better addressed to Congress than to the courts which were bound to follow the law as it
was. The court also regarded this argument as contrary to congressional objectives of providing
incentives to software innovators. The "narrow scope for functional writing" principle should
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Instead, the opinion continuously refers to copyright cases involving novels,
dramatic plays, and fabric designs. Courts have traditionally given broad
59
protection in these areas because of their artistic and fanciful character.
Despite its concentration on these cases, the court did not regard the Lotus
interface as an artistic or fanciful work. In one subsection of the opinion, the
court recognizes the functional character of the Lotus interface. 60 The
proper copyright consequences of this characterization, however, were not
clear to the court. The opinion dismisses Paperback's functionality argument
before the court sets forth the test for "copyrightability" to be used in the
in the parts
case. 16 ' The functionality of the Lotus interface is not 1discussed
62
of the opinion that analyze the copyright infringement.
The subsection of Paperback on the functionality issue begins with a
reference to what was apparently one of Paperback's several functionality
arguments.' 63 This argument compared the Lotus user interface to other
human-machine interfaces, which are outside the scope of copyright law.i64
instead have been integrated into the body of the court's infringement analysis, for it is a wellestablished principle of copyright law which applied to the dispute just as clearly as it would to any
other functional writing case. The CONTU Report and legislative history relevant to the scope of
copyright protection for computer programs reflect congressional intent that standard principles of
copyright law of this sort were to be applied in computer program cases. See CONTU Report (cited
in note 5) and text accompanying note 188.
159. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 51-52 (citing eight artistic and fanciful work cases for the
proposition that nonliteral elements of such works can be protected by copyright law); id at 54
(concluding that protecting nonliteral elements of copyrighted computer programs was "consistent
with the treatment of other kinds of intellectual works-specifically, with the treatment of nonliteral
elements of expression in musical, dramatic, and motion picture works, and works of literature"); id
at 60 (citing artistic or fanciful work cases in support of use of the "patterns of abstraction" test and
similar standard principles of copyright law); id at 70 (comparing the similarities between the Lotus
and Paperback interfaces to those in a case involving fabric designs).
160. Id at 54-58. The court states that "Lotus 1-2-3 is surely useful." Id at 57.
161. Id at 58-59.
162. Id at 65-70 (identifying the copyrightable elements of the Lotus interface and finding that
the copying by Paperback was sufficiently substantial to be infringing).
163. Id at 54. The court was quite critical of Paperback's attorneys for making their functionality
argument in many forms and for failing to state every premise and assumption of their argument. Id
at 56.
164. Id at 54-55. Put in its best light, Paperback's "useful article" argument might have been that
the Lotus 1-2-3 interface is a human-machine interface; that human-machine interfaces have
traditionally been proper subject matter for patent-not copyright-protection; that traditional
copyright law would reject human-machine interfaces from its domain under the "useful article"
doctrine; and that, in the Lotus interface, there was no separable "artistic" or "expressive" aspect
that could be protected by Lotus's copyright in the program. Every aspect of the Lotus interface is
directed to achievement of spreadsheet functionality, just as were the columns and headings of
Selden's ledger sheets in Baker v Selden.
It is somewhat surprising that the court in Paperback did not reject the "useful article" defense as
inapplicable because the program was registered as a "literary work." Some would say this rule only
applies to pictorial, sculptural, or graphic works. See HarperHouse, Inc. v Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F2d
197 (9th Cir 1989) (stating that the "useful article" doctrine does not apply to textual elements of
organizers developed to assist people in planning their activities, but ruling that some aspects of the
organizers were unprotectable because of their utilitarian character). The court in Paperback,
however, seems to accept that the doctrine had some relevance in computer program cases-an
aspect of his ruling quite consistent with Baker v Selden-because it states its understanding of the
doctrine more broadly than construction of the statutory provision might suggest: "those elements
of a useful article that can exist independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article are potentially
copyrightable because those elements are elements of expression that can be distinguished from the
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Two examples given were the "H" gear shift pattern for cars and the
"QWERTY" keyboard arrangement. In Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University
Computing Co.,i65 the court analogized the input formats for Synercom's
statistical analysis program to the uncopyrightable "H" gearshift pattern,
holding that there was no copyrightable expression in the formats that was
"separable" from the idea they embodied. Paperback construed Synercom as
having held "that the expression of nonliteral sequence and order is
inseparable from the idea and accordingly is not copyrightable."' 66 Paperback
then cited a number of cases that had either held or accepted the principle
that nonliteral elements of computer programs could be protected by
67
copyright law to support its rejection of Synercom.1
The Paperback opinion made several statements that reveal the heart of the
court's concern about Paperback's functionality arguments:
If, in a context such as that of Synercom or of this case, an idea and its expression were
taken to be inseparable and the expression therefore not copyrightable, copyright law
never would, as a practical matter, provide computer programs with protection as
substantial as Congress has mandated-protection designed to extend to original
elements of expression however embodied.
I credit the testimony of expert witnesses that the bulk of the creative work is in the
conceptualization of a computer program and its user interface, rather than in its
encoding, and that creating a suitable user interface is a more difficult intellectual task,
requiring greater creativity, originality, and insight, than converting the user interface
design into instructions to the machine.
Defendants' contentions would attribute to the statute a purpose to protect only a
narrowly defined segment of the development of computer programs, and to preclude
168
from protection even more significant creative elements of the process.

After construing Paperback's functionality arguments as involving "word
games" about the meaning of "useful articles" in copyright law, 169 the court
agreed with Paperback that the Lotus interface was useful, but insisted that
utilitarian functions of the article."

Paperback, 740 F Supp at 52 (emphasis in the original). Yet the

court does not identify what separable expressive elements exist in the Lotus interface. The court's
analysis instead shifts to the Whelan-like idea/expression test. See notes 45-52 and accompanying
text.
165. 462 F Supp 1003 (ND Tex 1978).
166. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 55.
167. Id. Note that the court converts the functionality argument into a nonliteral similarity
argument for which there are precedents to support its position. See note 90 for a further
explanation of Paperback's misunderstanding of Synercom. After string-citing several "nonliteral
elements" computer program cases, the court acknowledges that Sofiklone, 659 F Supp 449, and
Plains Cotton, 807 F2d 1256, had taken a somewhat different view, although without indicating that
both had cited approvingly to Synercom, as had E.F.Johnson v Uniden Corp of America, 623 F Supp 1485,
1500 (D Minn 1985); SAS Institute, Inc. v S &H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F Supp 816, 826 (MD Tenn
1985); and Kepner-Tregoe, 203 USPQ(BNA) at 133.
The court then asserts that the Synercom input formats were "quite different" from the nonliteral
elements of Lotus 1-2-3, although without saying how or why. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 55.
168. Id at 56 (citations omitted). To clarify my analysis of the court's concerns, I have separated
in the text these three statements. However, they appear in the opinion as consecutive sentences in
one paragraph of the opinion.
169. Id at 56, 71-73. The court states three different forms of its understanding of Paperback's
"useful article" defense. Id at 56-57. The arguments are not restated here, for they absurdly pose
the issue, and not surprisingly, the court finds them so rife with flaws as scarcely to require a
reasoned response.
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[i]t does not follow that when an intellectual work achieves the feat of being useful as
well as expressive and original, the moment of creative triumph is also a moment of
devastating financial loss-because the triumph destroys copyrightability of all
expressive elements that would have been protected if only they had not70 contributed
so much to the public interest by helping to make some article useful.'

The court then shifted the focus of its analysis to the idea/expression
distinction as interpreted in Whelan v. Jaslow,t 7 1 and no further word is heard
about functionality issues. There are several noteworthy things about the
functionality portion of the Paperback opinion. First, it contains no reference
to section 102(b), Baker v. Selden, or any of the functional work cases, except
Synercom, whose "central proposition" the court rejects.1 72 In addition, it does
not recognize that the CONTU Report explicitly mentions Baker v. Selden and
other functional work cases as copyright precedents on the idea/expression
170. Id at 57. The court then compares the usefulness of computer programs to that of
dictionaries, directories, and maps, to illustrate that just because something is useful does not
necessarily mean it is not copyrightable. Id at 58. This is an inappropriate comparison because
dictionaries, directories, and maps are not considered to be "useful" in a copyright sense because
their sole function is to convey information or portray an appearance. See Samuelson, 1984 Duke LJ
at 727-49 (cited in note 5). Computer programs are useful because they are processed in machines
to perform functional tasks the same as other machines. Computer program user interfaces are just
as much human-machine interfaces as are microwave oven control panels.
The court further argues: "To hold [that a work was uncopyrightable because it was associated in
the marketplace with a high degree of usefulness] would be to deny copyright protection to the most
original and least obvious products of the creative mind merely because the marketplace accepts
them as distinctively 'functional.' Such a rule would grant copyright protection for only those
products that fall far short of being the best available."
Such a rule "would offer incentives to
market only the second, or third, or tenth best, and to hold back the best for fear that it is too good
for copyrightability." Paperback, 740 F Supp at 58. Near the end of Paperback, where the
"standardization" defense is raised, the court expressed similar concerns:
By arguing that 1-2-3 was so innovative that it occupied the field and set a defacto industry
standard, and that, therefore, defendants were free to copy plaintiff's expression,
defendants have flipped copyright on its head. Copyright protection would be perverse if it
only protected mundane increments while leaving unprotected as part of the public domain
those advancements that are more strikingly innovative.
Id at 79. But see note 88 for a discussion of Baker v Selden's perspective on the irrelevance of the
novelty in copyrighted works.
171. The functionality subsection concludes with this statement which shows how the court shifts
away from functionality to idea/expression:
[A] court, in determining whether a particular element is copyrightable, must not allow one
statutory mandate-that functionality or usefulness is not itselfa basis for copyrightabilityto absorb and destroy another statutory mandate-that elements of expression are
copyrightable. Elements of expression, even if embodied in useful articles, are
copyrightable if capable of identification and recognition independently of the functional
ideas that make the article useful. This mandate may be viewed as a corollary of the central
distinction of copyright law between idea and expression ....
Paperback, 740 F Supp at 58.
See notes 41-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Paperback'suse ofa Whelan-like analysis
of idea and expression.
172. This section contains numerous references to computer program cases, but most of which
concern the "nonliteral" elements issue. One "useful article" case is cited for the proposition that a
copyrighted work does not lose its protected status when subsequently put to functional use. Brandir
Intl, Inc. v Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F2d 1142 (2d Cir 1987). It is odd that Paperback relied on this
case because, in it, the court ruled that a slightly modified version of the plaintiff's sculpture was
unprotectable by copyright because the changes made to the sculpture were functionally related to
its new function as a bicycle rack, causing it to become a "useful article."
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distinction that should be considered in computer program cases.' 73
Although the court recognizes the "merger" principle of copyright law, it
seems unwilling to apply the principle except as to trivial details of the Lotus
program. 174
More importantly, however, the court's statements reflect fundamental
misunderstandings of copyright law and principles. It is, for example,
inappropriate to say that user interfaces should be protected by copyright law
because the bulk of the creativity they embody resides in the
"conceptualization" of them.' 75 The text of section 102(b) indicates that
copyright does not protect "concepts" or "conceptualizations," no matter
how creative or original they are.' 76 The most creative thing about Selden's
book was undoubtedly the bookkeeping system explained in it, not the prose
he used to describe it. Yet the Court ruled that the scope of his copyright was
17 7
limited to his explanation of the system.
Nor is it proper to test whether an aspect of a copyrighted work is
protectable by measuring how much hard work went into either creating the
idea or implementing it in some concrete form. The Supreme Court's recent
Feist decision evidences that "sweat of the brow" does not automatically
178
signify the presence of "original expression" protectable by copyright law.
Moreover, creativity at the conceptual level does not always indicate that
copyrightable expressiveness will be present in all aspects of the concept's
79
written implementation of it, as Baker v. Selden also illustrates.1
The "otherwise not enough protection" argument is also not a proper
copyright argument. 18 0 Had such an argument been made in Baker v. Selden,
the Court's likely response would have been "that's what patents are for."' 8 "
Although there is some uncertainty at present about the patentability of
computer program-related inventions, user interface patents are now issued.
The Lotus interface, or at least some elements of it, might have been eligible
for a patent.182 Even if patent protection was unavailable for valuable aspects
of the Lotus interface, the "otherwise not enough" argument may more
properly be construed as an argument for some sui generis protection for user
83
interface features such as command hierarchies.'
173. See CONTU Report at 18-20 (cited in note 5).
174. See Paperback, 740 F Supp at 66. See also notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
175. Id at 56.
176. 17 USC § 102(b) (language quoted at text accompanying note 3).
177. See note 87 and accompanying text.
178. Baker v Selden, 101 US at 102. See Feist, 111 S Ct 1282.
179. See notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
180. See Feist, 111 S Ct at 1289-90. The strongest argument for "bending" the originality
requirement of copyright law to allow "sweat of the brow" protection for compilations was that
without copyright protection, there would be inadequate incentives to invest in the socially desirable
activity of compiling information. See Ginsburg, 90 Colum L Rev at 1899 (cited in note 108). Yet,
the Supreme Court in Feist expressly rejected this rationale for recognizing copyright protection for
these kinds of works. See Fest, 111 S Ct at 1289-90.
181. See Baker v Selden, 101 US at 102; note 88 and accompanying text.
182. See note 113 and accompanying text.
183. See, for example, Stem, 14 Colum-VLAJ L & Arts at 355 (cited in note 13); Abramson, 7
Computer L at 9-10 (cited in note 13).
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Although the court in Paperback did not accept the idea that achieving an
optimally useful user interface for a computer program could result in a
"devastating" loss of protection, 8 4 this result is consistent with traditional
principles of copyright law. In a report on the application of copyright
principles to computer programs, ten intellectual property scholars agreed
that
copyright should not protect aspects of an interface that optimize, in a way for which
there is no viable substitute, such design goals as rapid execution, accuracy of results,
error reduction, number, and/or speed of keystroke functions, or time, effort, or cost
of becoming skilled at using the program. Such functionally optimal aspects of an
interface should not be protected, regardless of whether the original designer
consciously employed systematic design analysis aimed
at optimization or simply
85
discovered an optimal interface aspect by intuition.1

An optimal computer program user interface would, in these scholars' views,
be an instance of "idea/expression merger." 18 6 The conferees did not expect

it would be easy to establish a "functional optimality" defense, but regarded it
as consistent with copyright principles to recognize it.187
The principle that copyright law does not protect creative concepts, hard
work, optimally efficient expressions, or other valuable elements of works

failing to satisfy copyright standards may, on occasion, seem to lead to unfair
results. As the Supreme Court recently observed:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of a compiler's labor may be used by others
without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, however, this is not
-some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme." It is, rather, "the essence of
copyright," and a constitutional requirement. The primary objective of copyright is
not to reward the labor of authors, but "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." . . . To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information [or
other uncopyrightable elements] conveyed by a work.' 8 8

The court in Paperback failed to recognize that Baker v. Selden, the other
functional writing cases, and section 102(b) embody the copyright principle
that the scope of copyright protection for functional writings is "thin,"
protecting only expressive aspects of such works, not details of their
functional content. CONTU expected the courts to heed these three sources
184. 740 F Supp at 57. Although there are places in Paperback where it might seem that the court
regarded the Lotus interface as optimally functional (see, for example, id at 57-58, 79), there was no
finding on this point. It is not asserted here that the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface was functionally
optimal. The point is rather that the court in Paperback was unable to accept the idea that a
functionally optimal interface might be unprotected by copyright law despite that it is consistent with
traditional principles of copyright law to hold that a functionally optimal interface is unprotectable.
185. LaST Frontier Report, 30 Jurimetrics J at 28 (cited in note 6).
186. See id at 27-28.
187. See id at 28. The "moment of achievement as moment of loss" argument is also clearly
inconsistent with Baker v Selden. The moment of Selden's crowning achievement was the moment of
devastating loss, for the Supreme Court ruled that by publishing his book, Selden had dedicated the
useful system in the book to the public domain unless patented. Baker v Selden, 101 US at 104. Baker
was free to copy the most important and valuable elements of the book because they were
components of the useful system described in it. That the elements were "original" and "expressive
of the system," that they were made up of lines on paper and words, did not change the Court's
thinking about their utility or their expressiveness being inextricably interconnected with the idea.
188. Feist, I I I S Ct at 1289-90 (citeation omitted).
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in interpreting copyright protection for computer programs.' t 9 CONTU's
assurances to Congress that the principles embodied in these sources would
yield a proper balance of the interests of program authors, competitors, and
the public are consistent with the views that led Congress to make section
102(b) a part of the statute. These principles are also not unintended
byproducts of the law, but of its very essence.
VI
CONCLUSION

The copyright provision defining the term "computer program" makes
clear that the set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
to bring about certain results is to be protected by copyright law. 190 Neither
the statutory definition, nor the legislative history of the provision, indicates
that the "results" achieved when the instructions are processed in the
computer are within the scope of the program copyright. Some program
results, such as highly fanciful videogame graphics, may have sufficient
"expressive" content that copyright will and should protect them. A user
interface, or other program result should not, however, be automatically
categorized as "expressive" merely because it is a result, because it is
valuable, or because hard work or creativity was required to bring it into
being. "Results" of computer programs are often functional in nature and
beyond the scope of copyright protection.' 9 1
Whether an aspect of a copyrighted work should be protected by copyright
should be tested by long-standing principles of copyright law requiring that
the aspect be "expressive." The court in Paperback did not convincingly
explain what was expressive about the aspects of the Lotus interface as to
which infringement was found. In particular, it neglected to consider the
implications of its indications that an important element of the Lotus
interface, namely, the Lotus command structure, was a constituent
component of the Lotus macrocommand system. The court also failed to
inquire whether other aspects of the Lotus interface were constituent parts of
the Lotus program's system for managing spreadsheet functions, which others
needed to be able to copy in order to "express" the same system.
This article raises is not asserting that there was nothing "expressive"
about the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface. The text of the opening screens, the
explanatory text in the on-line help facility, and the explanatory long prompts
seem to satisfy copyright standards for what constitutes original expression.
189. See CONTU Report at 18-23 (cited in note 5).
190. 17 USC § 101 (West Supp 1991) (definition of "computer program").
191. A recent article, for example, reports that advances in computer modeling and tools for
analysis of data from materials research labs have led to significant advances in the development of
materials such as "extra-tough steel . . . for bearings in space shuttle[s] .... " Otis Port, The New
Alchemy, Bus Wk 48 (July 29, 1991). These new materials may in a real sense be "results" of
processing programs in computers, but it would be improper to consider them derivative works
within the scope of the programmer's copyright. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Allocating
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U Pitt L Rev 1185 (1986).
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Paperback, however, did not copy these aspects of the Lotus interface,' 9 2
which is why this article questions the court's holding.' 93 Whether there were
other expressive aspects of the Lotus interface that Paperback did copy, apart
from those that were necessary to copy in order to "express" the same
spreadsheet management or macro language system, has yet to be
determined.
While this article doubts about whether there were other expressive
elements copied by Paperback, it is a subject on which reasonable minds
might disagree. It may be that upon appropriate detailed findings and a
proper copyright analysis, the court might still have found that Paperback
infringed the Lotus copyright. Paperback did copy more of the Lotus
interface than just the 1-2-3 command structure. It also copied much of the
mode of presentation of the Lotus commands. When the Paperback program
was in operation, an onlooker could have thought he or she was observing the
Lotus program in operation. 9 4 Exact or near-exact copying of a functional
writing can be a copyright infringement. A ruling of this sort in Paperback
would have been consistent with traditional principles of copyright law. It
could also have provided significant guidance to the software industry about
what aspects of user interfaces could properly be protected by copyright law
and why. The overbroad ruling in Paperback continues rather than resolves
the controversy about the protectability of user interfaces by copyright law. It
is unfortunate that only by many more years of litigation can the software
industry get definitive guidance on these important issues.

192. See note 17.
193. See, for example, Kepner-Tregoe, 203 USPQ (BNA) at 134 (only minor changes in wording
necessary to avoid infringement in functional writing case).
194. See Paperback, 740 F Supp at 70. Note, however, that this would import a trademark-like
"confusing similarity" standard into copyright law which generally looks to substantial similarity as
to protected expression.
One of Lotus's expert witnesses offered a definition of "clones" of software products which the
Paperback product may have satisfied. See Affidavit of Bernard Galler, Lotus Development Corp. v
Paperback Software Intl, CA No 87-0076-K, 91. Had the court ruled against Paperback because it was
a "clone" and defined "clone" with precision, it would have given guidance to the software industry.
It was to prevent "slavish" imitations by competitors that courts developed the "sweat of the brow"
theory of originality that the Supreme Court recently rejected in Feist, 111 S Ct at 1282. The validity
of Lotus's copyright in the 1-2-3 program has notbeen questioned; still, it is questionable whether a
"slavish" imitation of the Lotus product could be justified if the only aspects of the interface copied
were unprotectable by copyright.

